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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910778719103321 |
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Titolo |
The logic of strategy [[electronic resource] /] / edited by Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, Brian Skyrms |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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New York, : Oxford University Press, 1999 |
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ISBN |
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0-19-773080-9 |
1-280-47038-0 |
0-19-535365-X |
0-585-35740-4 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (208 p.) |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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BicchieriCristina |
JeffreyRichard C |
SkyrmsBrian |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Game theory |
Strategy (Philosophy) |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Contents; Introduction: What Is the Logic of Strategy?; Contributors; 1. Knowledge, Belief, and Counterfacual Reasoning in Games; 2. Consequentialism, Non-Archimedean Probabilities, and Lexicographic Expected Utility; 3. Solutions Based on Ratiftability and Sure Thing Reasoning; 4. Undercutting and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals; 5. Aumann's ""No Agreement"" Theorem Generalized; 6. Rational Failures of the KK Principle; 7. How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?; 8. Sophisticated Bounded Agents Play the Repeated Dilemma; 9. Can Free Choice Be Known? |
10. Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This philosophical study of rationality and knowledge, includes causal versus evidential decision theory, and counterfactual reasoning in games. And analyzes common knowledge assumptions in game theory, and evaluations of the normal versus extensive form formulations of complex decision problems |
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