Auction theory [[electronic resource] /] / Vijay Krishna

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910778496703321
• Autore: Krishna Vijay
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Boston, : Elsevier Academic Press, 2009
• ISBN: 1-282-28561-0; 9786612285615; 0-08-092293-7
• Edizione: [2nd ed.]
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (337 p.)
• Disciplina: 381/.1701
• Soggetti: Auctions - Mathematical models; Game theory
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di contenuto: Front Cover; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication Page; Table of Contents; Preface; Chapter 1. Introduction; 1.1 Some Common Auction Forms; 1.2 Valuations; 1.3 Equivalent Auctions; 1.4 Revenue versus Efficiency; 1.5 What Is an Auction?; 1.6 Outline of Part I; Part I: Single-Object Auctions; Chapter 2. Private Value Auctions: A First Look; 2.1 The Symmetric Model; 2.2 Second-Price Auctions; 2.3 First-Price Auctions; 2.4 Revenue Comparison; 2.5 Reserve Prices; Chapter 3. The Revenue Equivalence Principle; 3.1 Main Result; 3.2 Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle; 3.2.1 Unusual Auctions3.2.2 Uncertain Number of Bidders; Chapter 4. Qualifications and Extensions; 4.1 Risk-Averse Bidders; 4.2 Budget Constraints; 4.2.1 Second-Price Auctions; 4.2.2 First-Price Auctions; 4.2.3 Revenue Comparison; 4.3 Asymmetries among Bidders; 4.3.1 Asymmetric First-Price Auctions with Two Bidders; 4.3.2 Revenue Comparison; 4.3.3 Efficiency Comparison; 4.4 Resale and Efficiency; Chapter 5. Mechanism Design; 5.1 Mechanisms; 5.1.1 The Revelation Principle; 5.1.2 Incentive Compatibility; 5.1.3 Individual Rationality; 5.2 Optimal Mechanisms; 5.2.1 Setup; 5.2.2 Solution; 5.2.3 Discussion and Interpretation5.2.4 Auctions versus Mechanisms; 5.3 Efficient Mechanisms; 5.3.1 The VCG Mechanism; 5.3.2 Budget Balance; 5.3.3 An Application to Bilateral Trade; Chapter 6. Auctions ; with Interdependent Values; 6.1 The Symmetric Model; 6.2 Second-Price Auctions; 6.3 English Auctions; 6.4 First-Price Auctions; 6.5 Revenue Comparisons; 6.5.1 English versus Second-Price Auctions; 6.5.2 Second-Price versus First-Price Auctions; 6.6 Efficiency; Chapter 7. The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle; 7.1 The Main Result; 7.2 Public Information; 7.3 An Alternative Linkage Principle; Chapter 8. Asymmetries and Other Complications8.1 Failures of the Linkage Principle; 8.2 Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Second-Price Auctions; 8.3 Asymmetrically Informed Bidders; 8.4 Reserve Prices and Entry Fees; Chapter 9. Efficiency and the English Auction; 9.1 The Single Crossing Condition; 9.2 Two-Bidder Auctions; 9.3 The Average Crossing Condition; 9.4 Three or More Bidders; 9.5 Proof of Proposition 9.2; 9.6 Miscellany; Chapter 10. Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; 10.1 Efficient Mechanisms; 10.2 Optimal Mechanisms; Chapter 11. Bidding Rings; 11.1 Collusion in Second-Price Auctions11.1.1 Efficient Collusion; 11.1.2 Reserve Prices in the Face of Collusion; 11.2 Collusion in First-Price Auctions; Part II: Multiple-Object Auctions; Chapter 12. An Introduction to Multiple-Object Auctions; 12.1 Sealed-Bid Auctions for Selling Identical Units; 12.1.1 Discriminatory Auctions; 12.1.2 Uniform-Price Auctions; 12.1.3 Vickrey Auctions; 12.2 Some Open Auctions; 12.2.1 Dutch Auctions; 12.2.2 English Auctions; 12.2.3 Ausubel Auctions; Chapter 13. Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; 13.1 The Basic Model; 13.2 Vickrey Auctions; 13.3 Efficiency in Multiunit Auctions
• Sommario/riassunto: Vijay Krishna's 2e of Auction Theory improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna's ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves