1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910777399703321

Autore

Lin Yi-min

Titolo

Between politics and markets : firms, competition, and institutional change in post-Mao China / / Yi-min Lin [[electronic resource]]

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2001

ISBN

1-107-11922-7

1-280-42941-0

9786610429417

0-511-17549-3

0-511-01648-4

0-511-15585-9

0-511-30400-5

0-511-49938-8

0-511-04948-X

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (xiv, 255 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)

Collana

Structural analysis in the social sciences ; ; 18

Disciplina

338.0951

Soggetti

Mixed economy - China

China Economic conditions 1976-2000

China Politics and government 1976-2002

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. 223-247) and index.

Nota di contenuto

Introduction: economic market and political market -- Chinese industrial enterprises: a bird's-eye view -- Central planning and its decline -- The rugged terrain of competition -- Referee as player: menaces and opportunities for industrial firms -- Erosion of authority relations: a tale of two localities -- Favor seeking and relational constraints -- Competition, economic growth, and latent problems.

Sommario/riassunto

Between Politics and Markets examines how the decline of central planning in post-Mao China was related to the rise of two markets - an economic market for the exchange of products and factors, and a political market for the diversion to private interests of state assets and authorities. Lin reveals their concurrent development through an account of how industrial firms competed their way out of the plan



through exchange relations with one another and with state agents. He argues that the two markets were mutually accommodating, that the political market grew also from a decay of the state's self-monitoring capacity, and that economic actors' competition for special favors from state agents constituted a major driving force of economic institutional change.