1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910777353803321

Autore

Brennan Geoffrey <1944->

Titolo

Democratic devices and desires / / by Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin [[electronic resource]]

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2000

ISBN

1-107-11542-6

1-280-42021-9

0-511-17573-6

0-511-04007-5

0-511-15631-6

0-511-32920-2

0-511-49019-4

0-511-05089-5

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (x, 267 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)

Collana

Theories of institutional design

Disciplina

321.8

Soggetti

Democracy - Economic aspects

Political science - Economic aspects

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. 255-263) and index.

Nota di contenuto

Democratic desires. On human nature: beyond homo economicus -- Moral dispositions -- Economising on virtue -- Political mechanisms -- Mechanisms and dispositional choice -- Problems of democratic politics -- Democratic devices. Voting and elections -- Political representation -- Political parties -- The separation of powers -- The division of power.

Sommario/riassunto

This book offers an account of key features of modern representative democracy. Working from the rational actor tradition, it builds a middle ground between orthodox political theory and the economic analysis of politics. Standard economic models of politics emphasise the design of the institutional devices of democracy as operated by essentially self-interested individuals. This book departs from that model by focusing on democratic desires alongside democratic devices, stressing that important aspects of democracy depend on the motivation of



democrats and the interplay between devices and desires. Individuals are taken to be not only rational, but also somewhat moral. The authors argue that this approach provides access to aspects of the debate on democratic institutions that are beyond the narrowly economic model. They apply their analysis to voting, elections, representation, political departments and the separation and division of powers, providing a wide-ranging discussion of the design of democratic institutions.