1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910777041503321

Autore

Barnes Eric C (Eric Christian), <1959->

Titolo

The paradox of predictivism / / Eric Christian Barnes [[electronic resource]]

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2008

ISBN

1-107-18389-8

1-281-37079-7

9786611370794

0-511-39441-1

0-511-48733-9

0-511-39243-5

0-511-39506-X

0-511-39110-2

0-511-39372-5

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (x, 265 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)

Disciplina

501

Soggetti

Science - Philosophy

Science - Forecasting

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. 249-257) and index.

Nota di contenuto

Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; CHAPTER 1 The paradox of predictivism; CHAPTER 2 Epistemic pluralism; CHAPTER 3 Predictivism and the Periodic Table of the Elements; CHAPTER 4 Miracle arguments and the demise of strong predictivism; CHAPTER 5 The predicting community; CHAPTER 6 Back to epistemic pluralism; CHAPTER 7 Postlude on old evidence; CHAPTER 8 A paradox resolved; Glossary; Bibliography; Index

Sommario/riassunto

An enduring question in the philosophy of science is the question of whether a scientific theory deserves more credit for its successful predictions than it does for accommodating data that was already known when the theory was developed. In The Paradox of Predictivism, Eric Barnes argues that the successful prediction of evidence testifies to the general credibility of the predictor in a way that evidence does not



when the evidence is used in the process of endorsing the theory. He illustrates his argument with an important episode from nineteenth-century chemistry, Mendeleev's Periodic Law and its successful predictions of the existence of various elements. The consequences of this account of predictivism for the realist/anti-realist debate are considerable, and strengthen the status of the 'no miracle' argument for scientific realism. Barnes's important and original contribution to the debate will interest a wide range of readers in philosophy of science.