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1. |
Record Nr. |
UNISALENTO991003020359707536 |
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Autore |
Bocconi, Settimo |
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Titolo |
Collezioni capitoline : Museo capitolino, Palazzo dei conservatori, Museo nuovo, Pinacoteca, Tabularium / Settimo Bocconi |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Roma : [s.n.], 1950 (Roma : Istituto grafico tiberino) |
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Descrizione fisica |
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377 p., 78 c. di tav. : ill. ; 18 cm |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Roma Musei Collezioni capitoline |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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2. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910770257303321 |
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Autore |
Clempner Julio B |
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Titolo |
Optimization and Games for Controllable Markov Chains : Numerical Methods with Application to Finance and Engineering / / by Julio B. Clempner, Alexander Poznyak |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2024 |
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ISBN |
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Edizione |
[1st ed. 2024.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (340 pages) |
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Collana |
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Studies in Systems, Decision and Control, , 2198-4190 ; ; 504 |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Engineering mathematics |
Engineering - Data processing |
Dynamics |
Nonlinear theories |
Mathematical and Computational Engineering Applications |
Applied Dynamical Systems |
Engineering Mathematics |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Controllable Markov Chains -- Multiobjective Control -- Partially Observable Markov Chains -- Continuous-Time Markov Chains -- Nash and Stackelberg Equilibrium -- Best-Reply Strategies in Repeated Games -- Mechanism design -- Joint Observer and Mechanism Design -- Bargaining Games or How to Negotiate -- Multi-Traffic Signal-Control Synchronization -- Non-cooperative bargaining with unsophisticated agents -- Transfer Pricing as Bargaining -- Index. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This book considers a class of ergodic finite controllable Markov's chains. The main idea behind the method, described in this book, is to develop the original discrete optimization problems (or game models) in the space of randomized formulations, where the variables stand in for the distributions (mixed strategies or preferences) of the original discrete (pure) strategies in the use. The following suppositions are made: a finite state space, a limited action space, continuity of the probabilities and rewards associated with the actions, and a necessity for accessibility. These hypotheses lead to the existence of an optimal policy. The best course of action is always stationary. It is either simple (i.e., nonrandomized stationary) or composed of two nonrandomized policies, which is equivalent to randomly selecting one of two simple policies throughout each epoch by tossing a biased coin. As a bonus, the optimization procedure just has to repeatedly solve the time-average dynamic programming equation, making it theoretically feasible to choose the optimum course of action under the global restriction. In the ergodic cases the state distributions, generated by the corresponding transition equations, exponentially quickly converge to their stationary (final) values. This makes it possible to employ all widely used optimization methods (such as Gradient-like procedures, Extra-proximal method, Lagrange's multipliers, Tikhonov's regularization), including the related numerical techniques. In the book we tackle different problems and theoretical Markov models like controllable and ergodic Markov chains, multi-objective Pareto front solutions, partially observable Markov chains, continuous-time Markov chains, Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium, Lyapunov-like function in Markov chains, Best-reply strategy, Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms, Bayesian Partially Observable Markov Games, bargaining solutions for Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky formulations, multi-traffic signal-control synchronization problem, Rubinstein's non-cooperative bargaining solutions, the transfer pricing problem as bargaining. |
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3. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9911009336303321 |
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Autore |
Falcão Horacio |
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Titolo |
Pharma, Prices and Power : Reshaping Pharmaceutical Pricing Negotiations for a Healthier Future / / by Horacio Falcão, Rodrigo Gouveia, Hervé Lamarque |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2025 |
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ISBN |
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Edizione |
[1st ed. 2025.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (284 pages) |
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Collana |
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Future of Business and Finance, , 2662-2475 |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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GouveiaRodrigo |
LamarqueHervé |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Health services administration |
Industries |
Conflict management |
Public health |
Strategic planning |
Leadership |
Medical economics |
Health Care Management |
Mediation and Conflict Management |
Public Health |
Business Strategy and Leadership |
Health Economics |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Nota di contenuto |
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1. Introduction -- 2. Understanding Healthcare systems and their Negotiations -- 3. The Government (Payer) Challenge -- 4. The Biopharma Challenge -- 5. P&R Negotiation Challenges -- 6. What Can You Do Differently -- 7. Conclusion. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This book brings a negotiation perspective to healthcare. It opens the hidden box of pricing and reimbursement (P&R) negotiations, showing their huge impact on global healthcare systems and how they could be drastically improved. The authors offer a comprehensive and unique negotiation-based analysis of healthcare systems worldwide, |
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highlighting the historical, structural, and ethical challenges that shape P&R negotiations. From the role of governments and health insurers to the intricate dynamics between healthcare providers and users, the authors examine the forces driving healthcare costs and access. With a unique blend of theoretical expertise and practical experience, the authors propose a paradigm shift toward value-oriented negotiations. They show how to move away from adversarial win-lose tactics to collaborative and transparent negotiations. |
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