1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910778097103321

Autore

Plantin Guillaume

Titolo

When insurers go bust [[electronic resource] ] : an economic analysis of the role and design of prudential regulation / / Guillaume Plantin, Jean-Charles Rochet

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Princeton, : Princeton University Press, 2007

ISBN

1-282-12973-2

9786612129735

1-4008-2777-9

Edizione

[Course Book]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (112 p.)

Classificazione

83.70

Altri autori (Persone)

RochetJean-Charles

Disciplina

368.941

Soggetti

Insurance - State supervision

Insurance law - Economic aspects

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. [99]-101).

Nota di contenuto

Four recent cases of financially distressed insurers -- The state of the art in prudential regulation -- Inversion of the production cycle and capital structure of insurance companies -- Absence of a tough claimholder in the financial structure of insurance companies and incomplete contracts -- How to organize the regulation of insurance companies -- The role of reinsurance -- How does insurance regulation fit within other financial regulations? -- Conclusion : Prudential regulation as a substitute for corporate governance.

Sommario/riassunto

In the 1990's, large insurance companies failed in virtually every major market, prompting a fierce and ongoing debate about how to better protect policyholders. Drawing lessons from the failures of four insurance companies, When Insurers Go Bust dramatically advances this debate by arguing that the current approach to insurance regulation should be replaced with mechanisms that replicate the governance of non-financial firms. Rather than immediately addressing the minutiae of supervision, Guillaume Plantin and Jean-Charles Rochet first identify a fundamental economic rationale for supervising the solvency of insurance companies: policyholders are the "bankers" of insurance companies. But because policyholders are too dispersed to effectively



monitor insurers, it might be efficient to delegate monitoring to an institution--a prudential authority. Applying recent developments in corporate finance theory and the economic theory of organizations, the authors describe in practical terms how such authorities could be created and given the incentives to behave exactly like bankers behave toward borrowers, as "tough" claimholders.

2.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910765533303321

Autore

Baloge Martin

Titolo

Vie et mort de l’impôt sur la fortune : Les luttes pour la représentation des intérêts à l’Assemblée nationale et au Bundestag / / Martin Baloge

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Paris, : Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 2023

Paris : , : Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, , 2023

©2023

ISBN

2-7351-2909-8

9782735129096

9782735129072

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (300pages) : illustrations ; ; digital file (PDF)

Collana

Bibliothèque allemande

Soggetti

Taxation - Germany

Taxation - France

Wealth tax - Germany

Wealth tax - France

Property tax - Law and legislation - Germany

Property tax - Law and legislation - France

Public administration

France

Germany

Lingua di pubblicazione

Francese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Sommario/riassunto

Suspendu depuis de nombreuses années en Allemagne, l'impôt sur la



fortune a été supprimé et remplacé par un impôt sur la fortune immobilière au début du mandat d'Emmanuel Macron. Comment un impôt réputé difficile, voire impossible à supprimer a-t-il fini par disparaitre ? Afin de répondre à cette question, ce livre se concentre sur les batailles autour de l'ISF et les modalités du travail de représentation à l'Assemblée nationale et au Bundestag, jusqu'en 2017. S'appuyant sur des approches empiriques complémentaires, cette enquête entend expliquer comment les députés des deux pays représentent les puissants, les groupes dominants.