Part I: The transactions : sales of public franchises for private gain, undisciplined by competition, producing a concentrated, complicated industry no one intended Diverse strategies, common purpose : selling public franchises for private gain -- Missing from utility merger markets : competitive discipline -- The structural result : concentration and complication no one intended -- Part II: The harms : economic waste, misallocation of gain, competitive distortion, customer risks and costs -- Suboptimal couplings cause economic waste -- Merging parties divert franchise value from the customers who created it -- Mergers can distort competition : market power, anticompetitive conduct and unearned advantage -- Hierarchical conflict harms customers -- Part III: Regulatory lapses : visionlessness, reactivity, deference -- Regulators' unreadiness : checklists instead of visions -- Promoters' strategy : frame mergers as simple, positive, inevitable -- How do regulators respond? : by ceding leadership, underestimating negatives and accepting minor positives -- Explanations : passion gaps and mental shortcuts -- Part IV: Solutions : regulatory posture, practices and infrastructure -- Regulatory posture and practice : less instinct, more analysis; less reactivity, more preparation -- Regulatory infrastructure : strengthen regulatory resources, clarify statutory powers, assess mergers' effects -- The U.S. electric industry : a tutorial -- Appendix A.1 List of companies referenced -- Appendix A.2 Does federal bankruptcy law preempt a state commissions franchising authority? -- Appendix A.3 Ring-fencing provisions approved by the D. |