Insider threat study : computer system sabotage in critical infrastructure sectors / / Michelle Keeney [and six others]

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910715393303321
• Autore: Keeney Michelle
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Washington, DC : , : United States Secret Service, , 2005
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (45 pages)
• Soggetti: Computer networks - Security measures - United States; Law enforcement - United States; Computer networks - Security measures; Law enforcement; United States
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: "May 2005."
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: Introduction -- Prevalence of incidents of insider sabotage -- The insider threat study -- Characteristics of insider sabotage across critical infrastructure sectors -- Insider characteristics -- Organization characteristics -- Consequences to insiders -- Key findings of the insider threat study of sabotage across critical infrastructure sectors -- The insider's motive -- Pre-attack behavior and planning -- Advancing the attack -- Detecting the attack -- Consequences for targeted organizations -- Implications of the key findings for the prevention of insider sabotage -- The insider's motive -- Pre-attack behavior and planning -- Advancing the attack -- Detecting the attack -- Consequences for target organizations -- Conclusion: Reflections on the findings for the prevention of insider sabotage.
• Sommario/riassunto: A new report from the Secret Service and the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute's CERT found that most acts of insider sabotage on computer systems in critical infrastructure sectors were perpetrated by former employees--motivated at least in part by a desire to seek revenge--who were granted system administrator or privileged access when hired.