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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910698801303321 |
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Autore |
Krickus Richard J |
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Titolo |
The Afghanistan question and the reset in U.S.--Russian relations [[electronic resource] /] / Richard J. Krickus |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Carlisle, PA : , : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, , [2011] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (xii, 159 pages) : illustrations |
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Collana |
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Classificazione |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Security, International - Europe |
United States Relations Russia (Federation) |
Russia (Federation) Relations United States |
United States Relations Afghanistan |
Afghanistan Relations United States |
Russia (Federation) Relations Afghanistan |
Afghanistan Relations Russia (Federation) |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Title from title screen (viewed on Oct. 25, 2011). |
"October 2011." |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Summary -- Introduction -- The American skeptics -- Russian skeptics -- The American rationale -- The Russian rationale -- The study's objectives -- Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The decision to invade -- Escalation -- Bringing the Red Army home -- What was happening? -- The U.S. reaction -- The end -- The failure to create a stable post-Soviet government and civil war. The United Nations proposal -- Why the proposal failed -- Washington's and Moscow's failure -- The Taliban and Osama bin Laden. The origins of the Taliban -- Osama bin Laden -- The United States acknowledges bin Laden as a threat -- 9/11 and war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The September 2001 terrorist attacks -- Routing the jihadists -- The Karzai government -- Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda : an assessment -- A partial victory -- Three scenarios. The existing situation or plan A : an unstable but viable Afghanistan through COIN -- The insurgency -- The Karzai government -- Security forces -- The civilian-economic component -- |
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