1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910694431403321

Autore

Metz Steven

Titolo

Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom : the strategic shift of 2007

Pubbl/distr/stampa

[Place of publication not identified], : Strategic Studies Institute U S Army War College, 2010

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (xiv, 78 pages) : illustrations

Collana

Operation Iraqi Freedom key decisions monograph series  Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Soggetti

Iraq War, 2003-2011 - Decision making - Iraq

Counterinsurgency - Iraq

Civil-military relations

Strategy

Regions & Countries - Asia & the Middle East

History & Archaeology

Middle East

United States Military policy

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (pages 64-78).

Nota di contenuto

Introduction --  The decision. Political and strategic context -- Decisionmakers -- The process -- Decision shapers -- Decision criteria and dynamics -- Options considered -- Analysis -- Implications -- Recommendations -- Conclusion.

Sommario/riassunto

In this second volume of the series, Dr. Metz looks carefully at the 2007 decision to surge forces into Iraq, a choice which is generally considered to have been effective in turning the tide of the war from potential disaster to possible, perhaps probable, strategic success. Although numerous strategic decisions remain to be made as the U.S. military executes its "responsible withdrawal" from Iraq, Dr. Metz has encapsulated much of the entire war in these two monographs, describing both the start and what may eventually be seen as the beginning of the end of the war. In this volume, he provides readers with an explanation of how a decision process that was fundamentally unchanged, with essentially the same people shaping and making the



decision, could produce such a different result in 2007. As the current administration tries to replicate the surge in Afghanistan, this monograph shows the perils of attempting to achieve success in one strategic situation by copying actions successfully taken in another, but where different conditions applied.--