Strategy, national interests, and means to an end [[electronic resource] /] / Stephen D. Sklenka

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910694329703321
• Autore: Sklenka Stephen D
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Carlisle, PA : , : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, , [2007]
• Descrizione fisica: v, 26 pages : digital, PDF file
• Collana: Carlisle papers in security strategy
• Soggetti: Strategy; Ends and means; National interest - United States; Iraq War, 2003-2011; Operation Restore Hope, 1992-1993; Operation Allied Force, 1999; United States Military policy Evaluation; Haiti History American intervention, 1994-1995
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Title from title screen (viewed on Oct. 30, 2007).; "October 2007."
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (pages 21-24).
• Nota di contenuto: Introduction -- Ends, means, and the design of strategy -- Somalia on the periphery -- Strategic pitfalls of a Balkanizing policy -- Haiti and the American backyard -- Operation Iraqi Freedom and the ends-means disconnect -- Conclusion.
• Sommario/riassunto: The U.S. inability -- or unwillingness --to connect strategic ends and appropriate means to accomplish those ends has occurred so often over the past 15 years that one could make a credible argument that it has become a disturbing and pervasive characteristic of the modern American way of war. Beginning with a theoretical discussion of the relationship among ends, means, and strategy, this paper continues by examining specific cases of U.S. intervention from the previous decade and Operation Iraqi Freedom to demonstrate that when the U.S. commits its military forces, success can only be achieved if clear ends are identified, appropriate means are leveraged against those stated ; ends, and a coherent strategy is developed to coordinate the ends and means.