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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910686494003321 |
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Autore |
Napier Stephen E. |
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Titolo |
Uncertain bioethics : human dignity and moral risk / / Stephen Napier |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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New York, New York ; ; London : , : Routledge, , 2019 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (286 pages) |
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Collana |
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Routledge annals of bioethics ; ; 19 |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Chapter 1. Introduction -- Part I. Foundational Matters: The Perception of Value, Persons, and Human Worth -- Chapter 2. Moral Inquiry and the Apprehension of Value -- Chapter 3. Epistemic Justification, Peer Disagreement, and Practical Interest -- Chapter 4. Persons and Human Beings -- Chapter 5. Human Dignity -- Part II. Dignity as the Beginning and End of Life -- Chapter 6. Abortion -- Chapter 7. Human Embryonic Destructive Stem Cell Research -- Chapter 8. Euthanasia -- Part III. Balancing Dignity and Autonomy -- Chapter 9. Decision-Making for Patients with Suppressed Consciousness -- Chapter 10. Decision-Making for Patients with Apparent Competency -- Chapter 11. Risky Research on Competent Adults: Justice and Autonomy -- Chapter 12: Conclusion. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Bioethics is a field of inquiry and as such is fundamentally an epistemic discipline. Knowing how we make moral judgments can bring into relief why certain arguments on various bioethical issues appear plausible to one side and obviously false to the other. Uncertain Bioethics makes a significant and distinctive contribution to the bioethics literature by culling the insights from contemporary moral psychology to highlight the epistemic pitfalls and distorting influences on our apprehension of value. Stephen Napier also incorporates research from epistemology addressing pragmatic encroachment and the significance of peer disagreement to justify what he refers to as epistemic diffidence when one is considering harming or killing human beings. Napier extends |
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these developments to the traditional bioethical notion of dignity and argues that beliefs subject to epistemic diffidence should not be acted upon. He proceeds to apply this framework to traditional and developing issues in bioethics including abortion, stem cell research, euthanasia, decision-making for patients in a minimally conscious state, and risky research on competent human subjects. |
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