Research in law and economics [[recurso electrónico] ] : a journal of policy / / edited by Richard O. Zerbe, John B. Kirkwood

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910671560903321
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Amsterdam, : Elsevier JAI, 2007
• ISBN: 1-280-96288-7; 9786610962884; 0-08-047157-9
• Edizione: [1st ed.]
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (269 p.)
• Collana: Research in law and economics, , 0193-5895 ; ; v. 22
• Altri autori (Persone): ZerbeRichard O; KirkwoodJohn B
• Disciplina: 330.05; 340.11
• Soggetti: Law - General; Business & Economics - Economics - General; Jurisprudence & philosophy of law; Economic theory & philosophy; Trade regulation - United States
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: Lays vs. wages : contracting in the klondike gold rush / Douglas W. Allen -- Buyer power : economic theory and antitrust policy / Zhiqi Chen -- Generalized critical loss for market definition / Malcolm B. Coate, Mark D. Williams -- Price-fixing overcharges : legal and economic evidence / John M. Connor -- Predatory price cutting and standard oil : a re-examination of the trial record / James A. Dalton, Louis Esposito -- On the optimal negligence standard in tort law when one party is a long-run and the other a short-run player / Henrik Lando -- Should victims of exposure to a toxic substance have an independent claim for medical monitoring? / Thomas J. Miceli, Kathleen Segerson -- Market concentration, multi-market participation and antitrust / Dennis L. Weisman.
• Sommario/riassunto: Written by leading experts in the field, each chapter in this book examines in depth a topic in law and economics. John Connor begins ; by describing and evaluating the results of his extensive survey of reports of cartel overcharges. Dennis Weisman models the price effects of mergers that not only increase concentration in the relevant market but also increase the merged firms' participation in other, complementary markets. Malcolm Coate and Mark Williams develop a superior method for calculating critical loss in markets that are relatively homogenous and competitive premerger. Zhiqi Chen surveys recent developments in economic theories of buyer power and creates a general framework for antitrust analysis. Finally Thomas J. Miceli and Kathern Segerson, given the difficulty of collecting damages after a long latency period, examine the desirability of granting toxic exposure victims an independent cause of action for medical monitoring at the time of exposure. They show that such a cause of action increase incentives for injurer care but only at the cost of greater litigation cost and the reluctance of courts to adopt such a proposed cause of action reflect their awareness of this trade-off.