1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910588800003321

Autore

Gide André

Titolo

André Gide & Jef Last : Correspondance / / André Gide, Jef Last

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Lyon, : Presses universitaires de Lyon, 2022

ISBN

2-7297-1303-4

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (192 p.)

Collana

André Gide - Textes et correspondances

Altri autori (Persone)

LastJef

GreshoffC.J

Disciplina

848/.91209

B

Soggetti

Literature (General)

littérature française

littérature

littérature épistolaire

lettre

XXe siècle

Lingua di pubblicazione

Francese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Sommario/riassunto

André Gide, frais converti au communisme, et le jeune militant enthousiaste Jef Last se lièrent d’amitié en 1934, à l’occasion d’un grand meeting parisien. Dès le printemps suivant, ils voyageaient ensemble au Maroc ; en 1936, Last accompagne Gide en URSS... En 1947, il est encore à ses côtés aux Fêtes de la Jeunesse à Munich. Jusqu’à sa mort, Gide échangea une abondante correspondance avec « ce fou de Jef » (1898-1972), romancier et journaliste hollandais, polyglotte, grand voyageur et personnage pittoresque et haut en couleurs, l’« ami charmant » pour qui il avait éprouvé « cette sorte de sympathie subite et violente, qui bondit par-dessus les barrières factices ». Les quelque 180 lettres inédites publiées ici prennent place au côté des grandes correspondances gidiennes déjà connues, et sont particulièrement intéressantes pour comprendre la « politique » de Gide (le voyage en URSS, la guerre d’Espagne, Munich...), mais il y est aussi beaucoup question de littérature, de voyages – et d’amitié.



2.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910703640103321

Titolo

Nuclear safety : arrangement between the United States of America and South Africa, signed at Vienna, September 24, 2014, with addenda and annex

Pubbl/distr/stampa

[Washington, D.C.] : , : United States Department of State, , [2014?]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (18 unnumbered pages)

Collana

Treaties and other international acts series ; ; 14-924.3

Soggetti

Nuclear facilities - United States - Safety measures

Nuclear facilities - South Africa - Safety measures

Communication of technical information - United States

Communication of technical information - South Africa

Nuclear facilities - Safety measures - International cooperation

Treaties.

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Title from title screen (viewed on April 1, 2015).



3.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910576894703321

Autore

Higashijima Masaaki

Titolo

The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box : electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies / / [by] Masaaki Higashijima

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Ann Arbor, Michigan : , : University of Michigan Press, , [2022]

©2022

ISBN

0-472-90275-X

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (367 pages)

Collana

Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies

Disciplina

321.9

Soggetti

Elections - Corrupt practices

Elections - Corrupt practices - Kazakhstan

Elections - Corrupt practices - Kyrgyzstan

Dictatorship

Dictatorship - Kazakhstan

Dictatorship - Kyrgyzstan

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (pages 301-324) and index.

Nota di contenuto

; Part I. Puzzles and arguments -- ; Chapter 1. Introduction -- ; Chapter 2. A theory of autocratic elections -- ; Part II. Cross-national explorations -- ; Chapter 3. Blatant electoral fraud -- ; Chapter 4. Institutional manipulation -- ; Chapter 5. Economic maneuvering -- ; Chapter 6. Backfiring at the Ballot Box -- ; Part III. Comparative case studies -- ; Chapter 7. From electoral manipulation to economic maneuvering: Nazarbaev's Kazakhstan -- ; Chapter 8. From electoral manipulation to autocratic breakdown: Akaev's Kyrgyzstan -- ; Chapter 9. Conclusion.

Sommario/riassunto

Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box explores how dictators design elections and what consequences those elections have



on political order. It argues that strong autocrats who can effectively garner popular support through extensive economic distribution become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics--Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The book's findings suggest that indicators of free and fair elections in dictatorships may not be enough to achieve full-fledged democratization.