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1. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910511209403321 |
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Titolo |
Philosophy in an age of pluralism : the philosophy of Charles Taylor in question / edited by James Tully |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Cambridge, : Cambridge University Press, 1994 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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Locazione |
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Collocazione |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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2. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910783295403321 |
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Autore |
Lebow Richard Ned |
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Titolo |
We all lost the Cold War [[electronic resource] /] / Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Princeton, N.J., : Princeton University Press, c1994 |
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ISBN |
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1-4008-0480-9 |
1-4008-1249-6 |
1-282-75182-4 |
9786612751820 |
1-4008-2108-8 |
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Edizione |
[Course Book] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (557 p.) |
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Collana |
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Princeton studies in international history and politics |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Cold War |
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 |
Arab-Israeli conflict |
Arab-Israeli conflict - 1973-1993 |
Nuclear weapons |
Nuclear warfare |
United States Foreign relations Soviet Union |
Soviet Union Foreign relations United States |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliograhical references (p. [377]-521) and indexes. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Front matter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- ABBREVIATIONS -- CHAPTER ONE Introduction -- PART ONE: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962 -- CHAPTER TWO. Missiles to Cuba: Foreign-Policy Motives -- CHAPTER THREE. Missiles to Cuba: Domestic Politics -- CHAPTER FOUR. Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate? -- CHAPTER FIVE. Why Did the Missiles Provoke a Crisis? -- CHAPTER SIX. The Crisis and Its Resolution -- PART TWO: THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OCTOBER 1973 -- CHAPTER SEVEN. The Failure to Prevent War, October 1973 -- CHAPTER EIGHT. The Failure to Limit the War: The Soviet and American Airlifts -- CHAPTER NINE. The Failure to Stop the Fighting -- CHAPTER TEN. The Failure to Avoid Confrontation -- CHAPTER ELEVEN. The Crisis and Its Resolution -- PART THREE: DETERRENCE, COMPELLENCE, AND THE COLD WAR -- CHAPTER TWELVE. How Crises Are Resolved -- CHAPTER THIRTEEN. Deterrence and Crisis Management -- CHAPTER FOURTEEN. Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Weapons -- POSTSCRIPT: Deterrence and the End of the Cold War -- NOTES -- APPENDIX -- NAME INDEX -- GENERAL INDEX |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Drawing on recently declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American policy-makers, among them several important figures speaking for public record for the first time, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein cast new light on the effect of nuclear threats in two of the tensest moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the confrontations arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. They conclude that the strategy of deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers. |
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