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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910490031103321 |
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Autore |
Ray Debraj |
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Titolo |
A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation / / Debraj Ray |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Oxford, : Oxford University Press, 2007 |
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ISBN |
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0-19-160724-X |
0-19-152595-2 |
1-4356-3350-4 |
9786611145347 |
1-281-14534-3 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (336 p.) |
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Collana |
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Classificazione |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Contents; Preface; Chapter 1. Introduction; Part 1 The Setting; Chapter 2. Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Characteristic Functions and Cooperative Games; 2.3 Two Approaches to Coalition Formation; 2.4 Farsightedness; 2.5 Two Examples; 2.6 Negotiations: One-Time or Continuing?; Chapter 3. Coalitions, Cooperation and Noncooperation; 3.1 Definitions and Notation; 3.2 Coalitional Equilibrium; 3.3 Partition Functions; 3.4 Extensions; 3.5 Summary; Part 2 A Bargaining Approach To Coalition Formation; Chapter 4. Irreversible Agreements; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 A Model |
4.3 Equilibrium4.4 Rubinstein-Ståhl Bargaining; 4.5 Baron-Ferejohn Bargaining; 4.6 Summary; Chapter 5. Irreversible Agreements: Symmetric Games; 5.1 Symmetric Partition Functions; 5.2 An Algorithm; 5.3 Connecting the Algorithm to Equilibria; 5.4 A Remark on Nontransferable Payoffs; 5.5 Proofs; 5.6 Summary; Chapter 6. Applications; 6.1 Cournot Oligopoly; 6.2 Public Goods; 6.3 Proofs; 6.4 Summary; Chapter 7. Irreversible Agreements: The General Case; 7.1 Characteristic Functions and the Core; 7.2 Equilibrium Response Vectors; 7.3 No-Delay Equilibrium |
7.4 Condition M, Payoffs and Coalition Structure7.5 More on Efficiency; |
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