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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910483540403321 |
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Autore |
Choi Pak-Sing |
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Titolo |
Industrial Organization : Practice Exercises with Answer Keys / / by Pak-Sing Choi, Eric Dunaway, Felix Muñoz-Garcia |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2021 |
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ISBN |
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Edizione |
[1st ed. 2021.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (XIV, 441 p. 62 illus., 58 illus. in color.) |
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Collana |
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Springer Texts in Business and Economics, , 2192-4341 |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Industrial organization |
Microeconomics |
Economics - Psychological aspects |
Industrial Organization |
Behavioral Economics |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Nota di contenuto |
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1. Monopoly -- 2. Simultaneous quantity competition -- 3. Simultaneous price competition -- 4. Sequential competition -- 5. Regulating imperfectly competitive markets -- 6. R&D incentives -- 7. Mergers and Collusion -- 8. Bundling incentives -- 9. Incomplete information, signaling, and competition -- 10. Networks and switching costs. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This textbook presents exercises on industrial organization with detailed answer keys. While most textbooks on industrial organization focus on theory and empirical findings, this textbook offers practical examples that predict firm behavior in different industries. This book emphasizes the game-theoretic tools used in each type of exercise, so students can systematically apply them to other markets, forms of competition, or information environments where firms, consumers, and regulating agencies interact. The book begins with examples that analyze different models of firm behavior and interaction; starting with monopoly and moving through the Cournot model of simultaneous quantity competition, the Bertrand model simultaneous price competition, and sequential competition. The following chapters apply |
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game-theoretic tools to situations of increasing complexity: regulation; R&D incentives; mergers and collusion; bundling incentives; incomplete information, signaling, and competition; networks and switching costs. In addition to providing algebraic simplifications, some chapters also offer the unique feature of worked exercises based on published journal articles by leading scholars in the field. Finally, exercises are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise number, which allows students to pace their studies and instructors to structure their classes accordingly. Providing a rigorous, yet practical introduction to the field of industrial organization, this textbook is appropriate for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in economics and finance. . |
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