1.

Record Nr.

UNISA990000004240203316

Titolo

Trattato di medicina legale : e scienze affini … 19..

Pubbl/distr/stampa

XXXI, 1744 p., [3] p. di tav. : ill.

ISBN

88-13-21056-6

Disciplina

614.1

Collocazione

IML 36 5

Lingua di pubblicazione

Italiano

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

2.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910483152803321

Autore

Engst Benjamin G.

Titolo

The Two Faces of Judicial Power : Dynamics of Judicial-Political Bargaining / / by Benjamin G. Engst

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan, , 2021

ISBN

9783030460167

3030460169

Edizione

[1st ed. 2021.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (255 pages)

Disciplina

340.115

340.11

Soggetti

Political science

Europe - Politics and government

America - Politics and government

Comparative government

Governance and Government

European Politics

American Politics

Comparative Politics

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia



Nota di contenuto

1. The Two Faces of Judicial Power -- 2. The Judicial-Policy-Dialog Game -- 3. Judicial Power in Germany and the European Union -- 4. The First Face of Judicial Power -- 5. The Second Face of Judicial Power -- 6. Conclusion: The Implications of Judicial Power.

Sommario/riassunto

This book shows that constitutional courts exercise direct and indirect power on political branches through decision-making. The first face of judicial power is characterized by courts directing political actors to implement judicial decisions in specific ways. The second face leads political actors to anticipate judicial review and draft policies accordingly. The judicial–political interaction originating from both faces is herein formally modeled. A cross-European comparison of pre-conditions of judicial power shows that the German Federal Constitutional Court is a well-suited representative case for a quantitative assessment of judicial power. Multinomial logistic regressions show that the court uses directives when evasion of decisions is costly while accounting for the government’s ability to implement decisions. Causal analyses of the second face of judicial power show that bills exposed to legal signals are drafted accounting for the court. These findings re-shape our understanding of judicialization and shed light on a silent form of judicialization. Benjamin G. Engst is a Postdoctoral Researcher in Political Science at the University of Mannheim, Germany.