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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910465489803321 |
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Autore |
Vega-Redondo Fernando |
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Titolo |
Evolution, games, and economic behaviour [[electronic resource] /] / Fernando Vega-Redondo |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 1996 |
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ISBN |
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9786612052545 |
0-19-152508-1 |
1-282-05254-3 |
0-19-877472-9 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (222 p.) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Game theory |
Evolutionary economics |
Equilibrium (Economics) |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. [201]-206) and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Contents; 1 Introduction; 1.1 What is an Evolutionary Model; 1.2 Why Evolutionary Models?; 1.3 The Plan of What Follows; 2 Static Analysis; 2.1 Theoretical Framework; 2.1.1 Basic model; 2.1.2 Alternative scenarios: "Playing the Field" or "Pairwise Contests"; 2.2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy; 2.2.1 General definition; 2.2.2 Alternative interpretations of ESS: monomorphic vs. polymorphic populations; 2.3 Examples; 2.3.1 Pairwise contests: the Hawk- Dove game; 2.3.2 Playing the field: the Sex-Ratio game; 2.4 ESS and Refinements of Nash Equilibrium; 2.5 The Existence of an ESS |
2.6 Asymmetric Contests2.6.1 Introduction; 2.6.2 Ex ante symmetry with ex post asymmetries; 2.6.3 Example: the Hawk- Dove game revisited (I); 2.6.4 Extensive-form contests; 2.7 ESS and Finite Populations; 2.7.1 The "spite" of an ESS; 2.7.2 An example of oligopolistic competition; 2.8 Evolution and Cheap Talk; 3 Basic Dynamic Analysis; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The Replicator Dynamics; 3.2.1 The discrete-time case; 3.2.2 The continuous-time case; 3.2.3 Properties of the Replicator Dynamics; 3.3 The ESS and the Replicator |
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Dynamics; 3.3.1 The implicit dynamics of a monomorphic ESS |
3.3.2 ESS conditions and polymorphic stability3.4 Evolutionary Dynamics and Nash Refinements; 3.5 Some Examples; 3.5.1 The Hawk- Dove game revisited (II); 3.5.2 The Rock-Scissors-Paper game; 3.6 Replicator Dynamics in Mixed Strategies; 3.6.1 The model; 3.6.2 ESS conditions and dynamic evolutionary stability; 3.7 Permanence and Survival; 3.7.1 Definitions; 3.7.2 Necessary conditions for persistence and permanence; 3.7.3 Sufficient conditions for permanence; 3.7.4 Average behaviour in permanent systems; 3.8 Population Genetics; 3.9 The Prisoner's Dilemma; 3.9.1 Basic (unperturbed) model |
3.9.2 Noisy dynamics3.10 Pollination and Reward: An Example; 3.10.1 Preliminaries; 3.10.2 The model; 4 Evolution in Social Environments; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Theoretical Framework; 4.3 Evolutionary Growth Dynamics; 4.3.1 The model; 4.3.2 Monotonicity properties; 4.3.3 Some examples; 4.4 Dynamics of Monotonic Evolutionary Systems; 4.4.1 Dynamic stability and Nash equilibrium; 4.4.2 Set stability; 4.4.3 Long-run regularities; 4.5 Evolution and Rationality; 4.5.1 Evolution and pay-off dominance; 4.5.2 Evolution, iterative dominance, and rationalizability; 4.6 General Evolutionary Processes |
4.6.1 Gradient monotonicity4.6.2 Dynamic stability and rationality; 4.7 Examples; 4.7.1 Trading complementarities; 4.7.2 Risky trading; 4.8 A Simplified Ultimatum Game; 4.9 A Hierarchic Model of Cultural Evolution; 5 Stochastic Evolution; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 A Simple Example; 5.3 Theoretical Framework; 5.4 Analysis; 5.4.1 Large matching noise; 5.4.2 Small matching noise; 5.4.3 On the role of noise in evolutionary models; 5.4.4 Extensions; 5.5 Continuous-Time Dynamics; 5.6 Rate of Convergence and Interaction Pattern; 5.6.1 Global interaction; 5.6.2 Local interaction |
5.7 The Evolution of Walrasian Behaviour |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This textbook for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students of Evolutionary Game Theory covers recent developments in the field, with an emphasis on economic contexts and applications. It begins with the basic ideas as they originated within the field of theoretical biology and then proceeds to the formulation of a theoretical framework that is suitable for the study of social and economic phenomena from an evolutionary perspective. Core topics include the EvolutionaryStable Strategy (EES) and Replicator Dynamics (RD), deterministic dynamic models, and stochastic perturbations. A set of |
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