1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910465375403321

Autore

Mansell Samuel F.

Titolo

Capitalism, corporations and the social contract : a critique of stakeholder theory / / Samuel F. Mansell [[electronic resource]]

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2013

ISBN

1-139-61033-3

1-107-23508-1

1-107-52994-8

1-139-60874-6

1-139-05892-4

1-139-61219-0

1-139-62521-7

1-139-61591-2

1-299-25768-2

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (xi, 185 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)

Collana

Business, value creation and society

Disciplina

174

Soggetti

Social responsibility of business

Social contract

Capitalism - Moral and ethical aspects

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

An introduction to stakeholder theory -- The philosophy of stakeholder theory -- The corporation as a private association in a market economy -- The corporation as a sovereign power in a market economy -- Shareholder theory and its limitations.

Sommario/riassunto

In whose interests should a corporation be run? Over the last thirty years the field of 'stakeholder theory' has proposed a distinctive answer: a corporation should be run in the interests of all its primary stakeholders - including employees, customers, suppliers and financiers - without contradicting the ethical principles on which capitalism stands. This book offers a critique of this central claim. It argues that by applying the political concept of a 'social contract' to the corporation, stakeholder theory in fact undermines the principles on



which a market economy is based. The argument builds upon an extensive review of the stakeholder literature and an analysis of its philosophical foundations, particularly concerning the social contract tradition of John Rawls and his predecessors. The book concludes by offering a qualified version of Milton Friedman's shareholder theory as a more justifiable account of the purpose of a corporation.