| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910465246903321 |
|
|
Autore |
Soames Scott |
|
|
Titolo |
Philosophical essays . Volume 2 The philosophical significance of language [[electronic resource] /] / Scott Soames |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pubbl/distr/stampa |
|
|
Princeton, NJ, : Princeton University Press, 2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ISBN |
|
1-4008-3318-3 |
1-282-53144-1 |
9786612531446 |
0-691-13682-3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Edizione |
[Course Book] |
|
|
|
|
|
Descrizione fisica |
|
1 online resource (474 p.) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Collana |
|
Philosophical Essays ; ; Volume 2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Disciplina |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Soggetti |
|
Language and languages - Philosophy |
Linguistics |
Semantics |
Electronic books. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lingua di pubblicazione |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
|
|
|
|
|
Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
|
|
|
|
|
Note generali |
|
Description based upon print version of record. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di bibliografia |
|
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di contenuto |
|
Front matter -- Contents -- The Origins of These Essays -- Introduction -- PART ONE. Reference, Propositions, and Propositional Attitudes -- ESSAY ONE. Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content -- ESSAY TWO. Why Propositions Can't Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances -- ESSAY THREE. Belief and Mental Representation -- ESSAY FOUR. Attitudes and Anaphora -- PART TWO. Modality -- ESSAY FIVE. The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions -- ESSAY SIX. The Philosophical Significance of the Kripkean Necessary A Posteriori -- ESSAY SEVEN. Knowledge of Manifest Natural Kinds -- ESSAY EIGHT. Understanding Assertion -- ESSAY NINE. Ambitious Two-Dimensionalism -- ESSAY TEN. Actually -- PART THREE. Truth and Vagueness -- ESSAY ELEVEN. What Is a Theory of Truth? -- ESSAY TWELVE. Understanding Deflationism -- ESSAY THIRTEEN. Higher-Order Vagueness for Partially Defined Predicates -- ESSAY FOURTEEN. The Possibility of Partial Definition -- PART FOUR. Kripke, Wittgenstein, and Following a Rule -- ESSAY FIFTEEN. Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule- |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Following Paradox -- ESSAY SIXTEEN. Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox -- Index |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sommario/riassunto |
|
The two volumes of Philosophical Essays bring together the most important essays written by one of the world's foremost philosophers of language. Scott Soames has selected thirty-one essays spanning nearly three decades of thinking about linguistic meaning and the philosophical significance of language. A judicious collection of old and new, these volumes include sixteen essays published in the 1980's and 1990's, nine published since 2000, and six new essays. The essays in Volume 1 investigate what linguistic meaning is; how the meaning of a sentence is related to the use we make of it; what we should expect from empirical theories of the meaning of the languages we speak; and how a sound theoretical grasp of the intricate relationship between meaning and use can improve the interpretation of legal texts. The essays in Volume 2 illustrate the significance of linguistic concerns for a broad range of philosophical topics--including the relationship between language and thought; the objects of belief, assertion, and other propositional attitudes; the distinction between metaphysical and epistemic possibility; the nature of necessity, actuality, and possible worlds; the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori; truth, vagueness, and partial definition; and skepticism about meaning and mind. The two volumes of Philosophical Essays are essential for anyone working on the philosophy of language. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |