1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910464967103321

Autore

Finkel Meir <1968->

Titolo

On flexibility [[electronic resource] ] : recovery from technological and doctrinal surprise on the battlefield / / Meir Finkel ; translated by Moshe Tlamim

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Stanford, Calif., : Stanford Security Studies, 2011

ISBN

0-8047-7715-2

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (337 p.)

Altri autori (Persone)

TlamimMoshe

Disciplina

355.02

Soggetti

Military readiness

Military doctrine

Military art and science

Surprise (Military science)

Military history, Modern - 20th century

Technology - Military aspects

Electronic books.

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Prediction and intelligence : the dominant approach in force planning and its failure to answer the challenge of technological and doctrinal surprise -- Conceptual and doctrinal flexibility -- Organizational and technological flexibility -- Cognitive and command and control (C2) flexibility -- The mechanism for lesson learning and rapid dissemination -- The German recovery from the surprise of British chaff -- The German recovery from the Soviet T-34 tank surprise -- The Israeli recovery from the Egyptian Sagger missile surprise -- The Israeli air force recovery from the Arab anti-aircraft missile surprise -- The slow British recovery from the German armor and anti-tank tactics -- The slow Soviet recovery from the surprise of low-intensity conflict in Afghanistan -- The French failure to recover from the surprise of the German blitzkrieg.

Sommario/riassunto

This book addresses one of the basic questions in military studies: How can armies cope effectively with technological and doctrinal surprises-ones that leave them vulnerable to new weapons systems and/or



combat doctrines? Author Meir Finkel contends that the current paradigm-with its over-dependence on intelligence and an all-out effort to predict the nature of the future battlefield and the enemy's capabilities-generally doesn't work. Based on historical case analysis of successful ""under-fire"" recovery and failure to recover, he identifies the variables that have dete