1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910464573803321

Autore

Wei Shang-Jin

Titolo

Collateral damage [[electronic resource] ] : exchange controls and international trade / / prepared by Shang-Jin Wei and Zhiwei Zhang

Pubbl/distr/stampa

[Washington, D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, 2007

ISBN

1-4623-6088-2

1-4527-5113-7

1-283-51148-7

1-4519-1025-8

9786613823939

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (41 p.)

Collana

IMF working paper ; ; WP/07/8

Altri autori (Persone)

ZhangZhiwei <1974->

Disciplina

343.032

Soggetti

Foreign exchange - Law and legislation

International trade

Balance of payments

Non-tariff trade barriers

Electronic books.

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

"January 2007."

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. 14-15).

Nota di contenuto

Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Exchange Controls: Some Basic Patterns; 1. Evolutions of Restriction Indices; 1a. Summary Statistics for Restriction Indices; 1b. Correlations of the Control Indices, Tariff, and NTB Index; 2. Control Indices in Selected Countries; III. Statistical Analysis; 2. Benchmark Regressions; 3. Adding Time-varying Price Indices; 4. Developing Countries; 5. Additional Controls: Corruption and Trade Openness; 6. Finer Classification of Exchange Controls; 7. Emerging Market Economies during 1996-99; IV. Concluding Remarks

1. Exchange Controls: Source, Measurement, and Indices 2. List of Countries in the Sample; References; Footnotes

Sommario/riassunto

While new conventional wisdom warns that developing countries should be aware of the risks of premature capital account liberalization, the costs of not removing exchange controls have received much less



attention. This paper investigates the negative effects of exchange controls on trade. To minimize evasion of controls, countries often intensify inspections at the border and increase documentation requirements. Thus, the cost of conducting trade rises. The paper finds that a one standard-deviation increase in the controls on trade payment has the same negative effect on trade as an increase