1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910464257703321

Autore

Coady David

Titolo

Targeting social transfers to the poor in Mexico [[electronic resource] /] / David Coady and Susan Parker

Pubbl/distr/stampa

[Washington, D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, 2009

ISBN

1-4623-4468-2

1-4527-9245-3

1-282-84281-1

9786612842818

1-4518-7207-0

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (32 p.)

Collana

IMF working paper ; ; WP/09/60

Altri autori (Persone)

ParkerSusan

Soggetti

Public welfare - Mexico

Social service - Mexico

Electronic books.

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Contents; I. Introduction; II. Program and Data Description; Program Description; Tables; 1. Variables and Weights Used to Estimate the Discriminant Proxy-Means Score; Data Description; 2. Transfer Levels by Grade and Gender (pesos per month, 2002); III. Methodology; IV. Results; Figures; 1. Unconditional Probabilities; Targeting Performance Across Participation Stages; 2. Conditional Probabilities; 3. Targeting Performance by Stage; 4. Share of Targeting Performance by Stage; 5. Share of Targeting Performance by Stage; Policy Reform Simulations

3. Trade-off Between Vertical Targeting Performance and Program CoverageV. Summary; Appendix; Details of Simulations Estimating Targeting Implications of Universal Knowledge; Appendix Tables; 1. Results for Conditional Application and Acceptance Outcomes and Consumption Model; 2. Application Outcomes Under Universal Knowledge; References

Sommario/riassunto

Mexico's main social support program, Oportunidades, combines two methods to target cash to poor households: an initial self-selection by households who acquire knowledge about the program and apply for



benefits, followed by an administrative determination of eligibility based on a means test. Self-selection improves targeting by excluding high-income households, while administrative targeting does so mainly by excluding middle-income households. The two methods are complementary: expanding program knowledge across households substantially increases applications from non-poor households, thus