1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910464068503321

Autore

Kumhof Michael

Titolo

Chile's structural fiscal surplus rule [[electronic resource] ] : a model-based evaluation / / prepared by Michael Kumhof and Douglas Laxton

Pubbl/distr/stampa

[Washington D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, 2009

ISBN

1-4623-4770-3

1-4527-2585-3

9786612843082

1-282-84308-7

1-4518-7235-6

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (56 p.)

Collana

IMF working paper ; ; WP/09/88

Altri autori (Persone)

LaxtonDouglas

Soggetti

Fiscal policy - Chile

Finance, Public - Chile

Electronic books.

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; Figures; 1. Goods and Factor Flows in GIMF; A. Overlapping Generations Households; B. Liquidity Constrained Households; C. Manufacturers; D. Copper Producers; E. Unions; F. Import Agents; G. Distributors; H. Retailers; I. Government; J. Equilibrium and Balance of Payments; III. Calibration; IV. Choice of Countercyclical Coefficients; Tables; 1. Fiscal Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Volatility; 2. Policy Efficiency Frontiers; V. Choice of Surplus Target; 3. SFS Rule - Survey; 4. SFS Rule - Fiscal Accounts; 5. Balanced Budget Rule - Survey

6. Balanced Budget Rule - Fiscal Accounts7. Aggressive Countercyclical Rule - Survey; 8. Aggressive Countercyclical Rule - Fiscal Accounts; 9. Surplus Target Shock - Survey; 10. Surplus Target Shock - Fiscal; VI. Summary; References; Appendices; 1. Population Growth; 2. Optimality Conditions for OLG Households; 3. Consumption and Wealth; 4. Optimality for Manufacturing Firms

Sommario/riassunto

The paper analyzes Chile's structural balance fiscal rule in the face of copper price shocks originating in foreign copper demand. It uses a



version of the IMF's Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF) that includes a copper sector. Two results are obtained. First, Chile's current fiscal rule performs well if the policymaker puts a small weight on output volatility (relative to inflation volatility) in his/her objective function. A more aggressive countercyclical fiscal rule can attain lower output volatility, but there is a trade-off with (somewhat) higher inflation volatility and