1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910464010603321

Autore

Freedman Charles

Titolo

Why inflation targeting? [[electronic resource] /] / prepared by Charles Freedman and Douglas Laxton

Pubbl/distr/stampa

[Washington D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, 2009

ISBN

1-4623-4972-2

1-4527-2989-1

1-4518-7233-X

1-282-84306-0

9786612843068

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (27 p.)

Collana

IMF working paper ; ; WP/09/86

Altri autori (Persone)

LaxtonDouglas

Soggetti

Inflation (Finance)

Anti-inflationary policies

Electronic books.

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Contents; I. Introduction; II. Cost of Inflation and Boom-Bust Cycles; A. What Are the Costs of High Inflation?; B. Policy Credibility and Boom-Bust Cycles; Figures; 1. United Kingdom Inflation, Unemployment and Policy Credibility; III. Need for A Nominal Anchor; Tables; 1. Inflation Targeting Adoption Dates; IV. What is Inflation Targeting?; V. Two Key Intellectual Roots of Inflation Targeting; A. Absence of Long-Run Trade-Offs; Box 2.1; 1. Six Principles of Inflation Targeting; 2. Output-Inflation Tradeoffs in the Short Run and Long Run

3. IRFs for a Positive Demand Shock Under Good and Bad Monetary Policy4. IRFs for a Positive Supply Shock Under Good and Bad Monetary Policy; 2. Reduced-Form Inflation Equations Under Good and Bad Monetary Policy; B. The Time-Inconsistency Problem; 5. Taylor Output-Inflation Efficiency Frontiers; VI. How Does IT Work?; References

Sommario/riassunto

This is the second chapter of a forthcoming monograph entitled ""On Implementing Full-Fledged Inflation-Targeting Regimes: Saying What You Do and Doing What You Say."" We begin by discussing the costs of inflation, including their role in generating boom-bust cycles. Following



a general discussion of the need for a nominal anchor, we describe a specific type of monetary anchor, the inflation-targeting regime, and its two key intellectual roots-the absence of long-run trade-offs and the time-inconsistency problem. We conclude by providing a brief introduction to the way in which inflation targe