1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910464007003321

Autore

Gonçalves Fernando M

Titolo

Accumulating foreign reserves under floating exchange rates / / Fernando M. Gonçalves

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Stuttgart, Germany : , : W. Kohlhammer GmbH, , 2008

©2008

ISBN

1-4623-6690-2

1-4527-0267-5

1-4518-6957-6

1-282-84051-7

9786612840517

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (43 p.)

Collana

IMF Working Papers

IMF working paper ; ; WP/08/96

Disciplina

332.456

Soggetti

Foreign exchange rates - Econometric models

Bank reserves - Econometric models

Monetary policy - Econometric models

Electronic books.

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Contents; 1. Introduction; 2. Theoretical Model: Basic Set-up; 3. Complete Information; 3.1. Centralization; 3.2. Institutional Arrangements in Practice; 3.3. Separation; 3.4. Centralization versus Separation; 4. Incomplete Information; 4.1. Stage 1: Centralization versus Separation; Figures; 1. Timetable; 4.2. Stage 0: Centralization versus Separation; 5. Comparative Analysis Under Incomplete Information; 5.1. Simulation of Stage 0 Parameters; 2. Simulation of Stage 0 Parameters; 5.2. The Trade-off Between Reserve Accumulation and Credibility Building; 5.3. Centralization versus Separation

5.3.1. Macroeconomic Stability3. Macroeconomic Stability - Centralization versus Separation; 5.3.2. Reserve Targeting; 4. Reserve Targeting - Centralization versus Separation; 5.3.3. Discussion; 6. Concluding Remarks; References; Appendix; Proof of Proposition 1; Proof of Corollary 1



Sommario/riassunto

Official accumulation of foreign reserves may be perceived as interventions to influence the exchange rate, undermining the credibility of floating exchange rates and inflation targets. This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the interaction between reserve accumulation and monetary policy. The model uncovers a trade-off between the speed of reserve accumulation and anti-inflationary credibility. Under reasonable assumptions, delegation of intervention and monetary policy decisions to separate government agencies allows faster reserve accumulation, while centralization of these de