1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910464004803321

Autore

Fabrizio Stefania

Titolo

Breaking the impediments to budgetary reforms : evidence from Europe / / Stefania Fabrizio and Ashoka Mody

Pubbl/distr/stampa

[Washington, District of Columbia] : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008

©2008

ISBN

1-4623-9313-6

1-4527-4101-8

1-282-84043-6

1-4518-6943-6

9786612840432

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (33 p.)

Collana

IMF Working Papers

IMF working paper ; ; WP/08/82

Altri autori (Persone)

ModyAshoka

Disciplina

352.48

Soggetti

Budget process - Europe

Budget deficits - Europe

Electronic books.

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Contents; I. Introduction; II. Data and Empirical Approach; III. The Setting: War of Attrition; IV. Economic Shocks and Crises; V. Credibility: Does It Take Nixon To Go To China?; VI. Conclusions; Appendices; I. Quality of Budget Institutions; Appendix Tables; 1. Construction of the Index: Fiscal Institutions and Their Index Parameters; 2. Index of Quality of Budget Institutions; 3. Fiscal Institutions' Quality Index; II. Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis; Tables; 1. War of Attrition; 2. Political Constraints; 3. Economic Shocks; 4. Crises and Reforms

5. Credibility6. Model Predictions; Figures; 1. Average Value of Fiscal Institutions' Index, 1991-2004; 2. Quality of Fiscal Institutions' Index and Per Capita Income; 3. Fiscal Institutions' Index; 4. Interaction of Primary Balance and Fractionalization; 5. Nonlinear Effects in the Full Model; References



Sommario/riassunto

Under what conditions are budget institutions likely to be strengthened? We find that fiscal deficits do not help in focusing policymakers on undertaking reforms. To the contrary, the larger the deficit, the lower is the likelihood of reforms. Large deficits apparently imply strong claims on the budget and, hence, generate unwillingness to impose self-discipline. As such, countries will tend to move either to small fiscal deficits and good institutions or large deficits and weak institutions. Economic shocks (if they are large enough) can help build a constituency for improving budget institut