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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910464004003321 |
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Autore |
Stehn Sven Jari |
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Titolo |
Fiscal incentive effects of the German equalization system [[electronic resource] /] / prepared by Sven Jari Stehn and Annalisa Fedelino |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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[Washington D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, 2009 |
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ISBN |
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1-4623-6989-8 |
1-4527-6116-7 |
1-282-84338-9 |
1-4518-7271-2 |
9786612843389 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (31 p.) |
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Collana |
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IMF working paper ; ; WP/09/124 |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Soggetti |
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Intergovernmental fiscal relations - Germany |
Fiscal policy - Germany |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Contents; I. Introduction; II. Fiscal Discipline and Fiscal Transfers: A Difficult Nexus; Figures; 1. Subnational Shares in Total Spending and Revenue, 2006; 2. Comparative Composition of Subnational Revenue; A. Germany's Transfer System; 3. Net Contributing and Net Receiving Länder; 4. Evolution of the Transfer System; B. Potential Implications of Transfers; 5. Debt by Government Level; 6: Länder Debt; III. Framework, Methodology, and Data; A. The Inter-Temporal Budget Constraint; B. Cyclicality; C. Data; IV. Empirical Analysis; Tables; 1. Germany: Descriptive Statistics, 1985-2007 |
A. Univariate Analysis: Fiscal Reaction Functions2. Fiscal Behavior of the Old Länder, 1985-2007; 3. Behavior of Primary Expenditure for Länder, 1985-2007; 4. Robustness Check I: Behavior of Primary Expenditure for Länder, 1985-2007; B. Multivariate Analysis: VARs; 5. Robustness Check II: Behavior of Primary Expenditure; 7. Länder Behavior and Average Received Transfers, 1985-2007; 8. Output Gap Shock; V. Policy Implications and Conclusions; 9. Primary Spending Shock; Appendix I; Appendix Table 6: Unit root tests; References |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Does reliance on transfers weaken fiscal discipline and encourage pro-cyclical fiscal policies in recipient subnational governments? Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of the German Länder, this paper finds a positive answer to both questions. Net-recipient states (Länder, benefiting from the transfer system) have not reduced primary expenditure significantly in response to rising deficits, but have instead relied on vertical transfers from the federal government to ensure debt sustainability. Moreover, they have pursued pro-cyclical policies, particularly by raising expenditures in g |
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