|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910463118403321 |
|
|
Autore |
Jones Milo <1967-> |
|
|
Titolo |
Constructing Cassandra [[electronic resource] ] : reframing intelligence failure at the CIA, 1947-2001 / / Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pubbl/distr/stampa |
|
|
Stanford, Calif., : Stanford University Press, 2013 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ISBN |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Descrizione fisica |
|
1 online resource (375 pages) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Altri autori (Persone) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Disciplina |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Soggetti |
|
Intelligence service - United States - History |
Electronic books. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lingua di pubblicazione |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
|
|
|
|
|
Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
|
|
|
|
|
Note generali |
|
Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di bibliografia |
|
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di contenuto |
|
Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- ABBREVIATIONS -- INTRODUCTION -- 1. THE WORK OF INTELLIGENCE -- 2. HOW THE CIA IS MADE -- 3. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION -- 4. THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR -- 5. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS -- 6. THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 -- 7. THE CIA AND THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE -- NOTES -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sommario/riassunto |
|
Constructing Cassandra analyzes the intelligence failures at the CIA that resulted in four key strategic surprises experienced by the US: the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks—surprises still play out today in U.S. policy. Although there has been no shortage of studies exploring how intelligence failures can happen, none of them have been able to provide a unified understanding of the phenomenon. To correct that omission, this book brings culture and identity to the foreground to present a unified model of strategic surprise; one that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, and takes seriously those Cassandras who offered warnings, but were ignored. This systematic exploration of the sources of the CIA's intelligence failures points to ways to prevent future strategic surprises. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|