Military adaptation in Afghanistan [[electronic resource] /] / edited by Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and James A. Russell

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910463038403321
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Stanford, Calif., : Stanford Security Studies, [2013]
• ISBN: 0-8047-8676-3
• Descrizione fisica: xv, 345 p
• Altri autori (Persone): FarrellTheo <1967->; OsingaFrans P. B; RussellJames A <1958-> (James Avery)
• Disciplina: 958.104/74
• Soggetti: Afghan War, 2001-2021; Operational art (Military science); Tactics; Military policy; Electronic books.
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Front matter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Contributors -- Abbreviations -- 1. Introduction: Military Adaptation in War -- 2. The Great Game and the Quagmire: Military Adaptation in the British and Soviet Wars in Afghanistan, 1839 –1989 -- 3. Into the Great Wadi: The United States and the War in Afghanistan -- 4. ISAF and NATO : Campaign Innovation and Organizational Adaptation -- 5. Back from the Brink: British Military Adaptation and the Struggle for Helmand, 2006–2011 -- 6. The Military Metier: Second Order Adaptation and the Danish Experience in Task Force Helmand -- 7. Soft Power, the Hard Way: Adaptation by the Netherlands’ Task Force Uruzgan -- 8. Mission Command without a Mission: German Military Adaptation in Afghanistan -- 9. Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Minority Government and Generational Change while under Fire -- 10. Military Adaptation by the Taliban, 2002–2011 -- 11. Shoulder-to-Shoulder Fighting Different Wars: NATO Advisors and Military Adaptation in the Afghan National Army, 2001–2011 -- 12. Conclusion: Military Adaptation and the War in Afghanistan -- Index
• Sommario/riassunto: When NATO took charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan in 2003, ISAF conceptualized its mission largely as a stabilization and reconstruction deployment. However, as the campaign has evolved and the insurgency has proved to more resistant and capable, key operational imperatives have emerged, including military support to the civilian development effort, closer partnering with Afghan security forces, and greater military restraint. All participating militaries have adapted, to varying extents, to these campaign imperatives and pressures. This book analyzes these initiatives and their outcomes by focusing on the experiences of three groups of militaries: those of Britain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the US, which have faced the most intense operational and strategic pressures; Germany, who's troops have faced the greatest political and cultural constraints; and the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Taliban, who have been forced to adapt to a very different sets of circumstances.