| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910462862503321 |
|
|
Autore |
Locke Richard M. <1959-> |
|
|
Titolo |
The Promise and limits of private power : promoting labor standards in a global economy / / Richard M. Locke [[electronic resource]] |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pubbl/distr/stampa |
|
|
Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2013 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ISBN |
|
1-107-06548-8 |
1-316-09070-1 |
1-107-05696-9 |
1-107-25570-8 |
1-107-05810-4 |
1-107-05941-0 |
1-139-38184-9 |
1-107-05588-1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Descrizione fisica |
|
1 online resource (xiv, 208 pages) : digital, PDF file(s) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Collana |
|
Cambridge studies in comparative politics |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Disciplina |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Soggetti |
|
Industrial relations |
International business enterprises - Management |
Globalization |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lingua di pubblicazione |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
|
|
|
|
|
Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
|
|
|
|
|
Note generali |
|
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di bibliografia |
|
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di contenuto |
|
Contents; Acknowledgments; 1 The Rise of Private Voluntary Regulation in a Global Economy; Introduction; We Live in a World of Global Supply Chains; Athletic Footwear; Mobile Electronic Devices; Private Voluntary Regulation as a "Second-Best" Solution; Conflicting Interests and Collective Action Problems Inherent in Private Voluntary Initiatives; The Argument in Brief; 2 The Promise and Perils of Private Compliance Programs; Private Compliance: A Review of the Literature; Key Features and Underlying Assumptions of Private Compliance Programs |
Notes from the Field: How Private Compliance Programs "Work" in PracticeReliable Information? A Closer Look at the Audit Process; Flawed Incentives? Whose Behavior Do We Want to Change, Anyway?; Private Compliance Efforts at ABC and HP; ABC; Hewlett-Packard; 3 Does Private Compliance Improve Labor Standards?; Nike and the Athletic Footwear Industry; Does Private Compliance Work? A Look at |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
the Data; How Good or Bad Are Working Conditions?; Explaining the Variation in M-Audit Scores; Country and Industry Effects; The Change in Labor Compliance over Time; Changes in M-Audit Scores |
The Change in Compliance RatingsAppendix 3.1. Nike Code of Conduct; Employment Is Voluntary; Employees Are Age 16 or Older; Contractor Does Not Discriminate; Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining Are Respected; Compensation Is Timely Paid; Harassment and Abuse Are Not Tolerated; Working Hours Are Not Excessive; Regular Employment Is Provided; The Workplace Is Healthy and Safe; Environmental Impact Is Minimized; The Code Is Fully Implemented; Appendix 3.2. Nikes Compliance Rating System; Appendix 3.3. Explaining the Variation of First M-Audit Score: Alternative Country Level Indices |
Appendix 3.4. Explaining the Variation of First M-Audit Score: Hierarchical ModelsAppendix 3.5. Explaining Variation in Specific M-Audit Items: Wages and Work Hours; 4 Capability Building and Its Limitations; Capability Building - Theoretical Roots and Mechanisms; The Movement Away from Traditional Compliance; International Aid and Capacity Building; Capability Building in Global Value Chains; Capability Building as a Normative Ideal; Capability Building in Practice; Upgrading through Factory Inspections: Vignettes from ABC's Supply Chain |
Improving Competitiveness and Compliance at Sula ShirtsTackling Excess Overtime: The Case of Ambar Designs; Health and Safety Improvements in the Dominican Republic; The Mixed Results of Capability-Building: Lessons from the ILO's Factory Improvement Program; FIP Vietnam; FIP India; Do Capability-Building Programs Really Make a Difference? Evidence from HP's Focused Improvement Supplier Initiative China; Concluding Considerations: The Politics of Capability Building; 5 Alternative Approaches to Capability Building; A Tale of Two Factories; Two Worlds of Work; Wages; Employee Satisfaction |
Participation in Production Planning |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sommario/riassunto |
|
This book examines and evaluates various private initiatives to enforce fair labor standards within global supply chains. Using unique data (internal audit reports and access to more than 120 supply chain factories and 700 interviews in 14 countries) from several major global brands, including NIKE, HP and the International Labor Organization's Factory Improvement Programme in Vietnam, this book examines both the promise and the limitations of different approaches to actually improve working conditions, wages and working hours for the millions of workers employed in today's global supply chains. Through a careful, empirically grounded analysis of these programs, this book illustrates the mix of private and public regulation needed to address these complex issues in a global economy. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |