Multiethnic coalitions in Africa : business financing of opposition election campaigns / / Leonardo R. Arriola [[electronic resource]]

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910462536303321
• Autore: Arriola Leonardo R (Leonardo Rafael)
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2012
• ISBN: 1-316-08981-9; 1-139-57953-3; 1-283-63766-9; 1-139-57005-6; 1-107-25444-2; 1-139-57271-7; 1-139-10855-7; 1-139-56915-5; 1-139-57096-X
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (xvii, 304 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
• Collana: Cambridge studies in comparative politics
• Disciplina: 324.70967
• Soggetti: Opposition (Political science) - Africa, Sub-Saharan; Electoral coalitions - Africa, Sub-Saharan; Campaign funds - Africa, Sub-Saharan; Africa, Sub-Saharan Ethnic relations Political aspects; Africa, Sub-Saharan Politics and government 1960-; Kenya Politics and government; Cameroon Politics and government
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: The puzzle of opposition coordination -- A theory of pecuniary coalition formation -- The emergence of financial reprisal regimes -- The political control of banking -- The liberalization of capital -- The political alignment of business -- Opposition bargaining across ethnic cleavages -- Multiethnic opposition coalitions in African elections -- Democratic consolidation in Africa -- Appendix A: Commercial banking sector size and opposition coalitions in Africa -- Appendix B: Sources on commodity exports and ethnic production by country -- Appendix ; C: Variables: definitions, sources, and summary statistics -- Appendix D: Multiethnic opposition coalitions in Africa, 1990-2005.
• Sommario/riassunto: Why are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals.