1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910462075803321

Autore

Cobben Paul

Titolo

The Paradigm of recognition [[electronic resource] ] : freedom as overcoming the fear of death / / by Paul Cobben

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Leiden ; ; Boston, : Brill, 2012

ISBN

1-280-77268-9

9786613683458

90-04-23150-1

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (221 p.)

Collana

Critical studies in German idealism ; ; v. 7

Disciplina

193

Soggetti

Recognition (Philosophy)

Electronic books.

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Answering Honneth's Questions from the Viewpoint of the Phenomenology of Spirit.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Preliminary Material -- 1. Recognition as the New Paradigm -- 2. Overcoming Cartesian Dualism: From Kant’s Criticism of Hume to Hegel’s Criticism of Kant -- 3. Self-Consciousness: The Practical Foundation of Theoretical Reason -- 4. The “System of Freedom”: Religion of Nature -- 5. Axel Honneth’s Interpretation of the Self-Consciousness Chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit -- 6. Grounding the Paradigm of Recognition -- 7. The Domain of Love -- 8. The Domain of Respect: Recognition at the Level of Civil Society -- 9. The Domain of Solidarity: The Third Fundamental Form of Mutual Recognition -- 10. Hegel’s Concept of the Absolute Spirit and the Paradigm of Recognition -- Literature -- Index.

Sommario/riassunto

In The Paradigm of Recognition. Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death Paul Cobben defends the position that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit contains all the building blocks to elaborate a paradigm of recognition which fundamentally criticizes the contemporary versions of Habermas, Rawls and Honneth. In his concept of recognition, the fear of death is the central category to understand the mediation between freedom and nature. Cobben not only systematically



reconstructs how this view results from Hegel’s criticism of Hume and Kant, but also shows how Hegel’s three-part division of social freedom is based on this mediation. Therefore, Honneth wrongly thinks that his three forms of social freedom (related to love, respect and solidarity) correspond to Hegel’s three-part division.