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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910461963503321 |
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Autore |
Cole Shawn |
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Titolo |
Barriers to household risk management [[electronic resource] ] : evidence from India / / Shawn Cole ... [et al.] |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C., : International Monetary Fund, c2012 |
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ISBN |
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1-4755-6547-X |
1-4755-1234-1 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (44 p.) |
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Collana |
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IMF working paper ; ; WP/12/195 |
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Soggetti |
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Financial risk - India |
Risk management - India |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover; Abstract; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Insurance Contract Design and Summary Statistics; A. Product Description; B. Summary Statistics; III. Experimental Design; IV. Experimental Results; A. Andhra Pradesh; B. Gujarat: Video Experiments; C. Gujarat: Flyer Experiments; V. Discussion of Experimental Results; A. Price Relative to Actuarial Value; B. Trust; C. Liquidity Constraints; D. Financial Literacy and Education; E. Framing, Salience and Other Behavioral Factors; VI. Non-Experimental Evidence; A. Correlates of Insurance Purchase; B. Self-Reported Explanations for Non-Purchase |
VII. Improving Household Risk Management: Tentative Lessons and ConclusionsReferences; VIII. Appendix |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Why do many households remain exposed to large exogenous sources of non-systematic income risk? We use a series of randomized field experiments in rural India to test the importance of price and non-price factors in the adoption of an innovative rainfall insurance product. Demand is significantly price sensitive, but widespread take-up would not be achieved even if the product offered a payout ratio comparable to U.S. insurance contracts. We present evidence suggesting that lack of trust, liquidity constraints and limited salience are significant non-price frictions that constrain demand. We s |
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