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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910461688103321 |
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Autore |
Bano Masooda <1973-> |
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Titolo |
Breakdown in Pakistan [[electronic resource] ] : how aid is eroding institutions for collective action / / Masooda Bano |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Stanford, CA, : Stanford Economics and Finance, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2012 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (238 p.) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Economic assistance - Social aspects - Pakistan |
Non-governmental organizations - Pakistan |
Associations, institutions, etc - Pakistan |
Civil society - Pakistan |
Cooperation - Pakistan |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Contents; List of Illustrations; Preface; 1. Revisiting the Collective Action Dilemma; 2. Intrinsic or Extrinsic Incentives: The Evolution of Cooperative Groups in Pakistan; 3. Why Cooperate? : Motives and Decisions of Initiators and Joiners in Other-Regarding Groups; 4. Why Cooperate? : Motives and Decisions of Initiators and Joiners in Self-Regarding Groups; 5. Does Aid Break Down Cooperation?; 6. Why Aid Breaks Down Cooperation; 7. Fixing Incentives: The Way Forward; Glossary; Bibliography; Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Thirty percent of foreign development aid is channeled through NGOs or community-based organizations to improve service delivery to the poor, build social capital, and establish democracy in developing nations. However, growing evidence suggests that aid often erodes, rather than promotes, cooperation within developing nations. This book presents a rare, micro level account of the complex decision-making processes that bring individuals together to form collective-action platforms. It then examines why aid often breaks down the very institutions for collective action that it aims to prom |
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