1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910461323003321

Autore

Vohra Rakesh V.

Titolo

Mechanism design : a linear programming approach / / Rakesh V. Vohra [[electronic resource]]

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2011

ISBN

1-107-71423-0

0-511-83521-3

1-283-19323-X

1-139-07619-1

9786613193230

1-139-08302-3

1-139-07047-9

1-139-08075-X

1-139-07848-8

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (x, 172 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)

Collana

Econometric Society monographs ; ; 47

Disciplina

658.4/033

Soggetti

Decision making - Linear programming

Organizational behavior - Mathematical models

Machine theory

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Arrow's theorem and its consequences; 3. Network flow problem; 4. Incentive compatibility; 5. Efficiency; 6. Revenue maximization; 7. Rationalizability.

Sommario/riassunto

Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify



results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.