Coercion, survival, and war : why weak states resist the United States / / Phil Haun

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910460435003321
• Autore: Haun Phil M.
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Stanford, California : , : Stanford Security Studies, , 2015; ©2015
• ISBN: 0-8047-9507-X
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (286 p.)
• Collana: Stanford security studies
• Disciplina: 355.4/2
• Soggetti: Asymmetric warfare - United States; Asymmetric warfare; Electronic books.; United States Military policy Case studies; United States Foreign relations Case studies
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Includes index.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Front matter -- CONTENTS -- List of Tables, Figures, and Maps -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A Theory of Asymmetric Interstate Coercion -- 3. Survival and Coercion Failure -- 4. The United States versus Iraq: The Gulf and Iraq Wars -- 5. The United States versus Serbia: Bosnia and Kosovo -- 6. The United States versus Libya: El Dorado Canyon, Pan Am Flight 103, and Weapons of Mass Destruction -- 7. Conclusion -- Appendix A: Coding U.S. Cases of Asymmetric Coercion -- Appendix B: Asymmetric Coercion Model -- Notes -- Index
• Sommario/riassunto: In asymmetric interstate conflicts, great powers have the capability to coerce weak states by threatening their survival—but not vice versa. It is therefore the great power that decides whether to escalate a conflict into a crisis by adopting a coercive strategy. In practice, however, the coercive strategies of the U.S. have frequently failed. In Coercion, Survival and War Phil Haun chronicles 30 asymmetric interstate crises involving the US from 1918 to 2003. The U.S. chose coercive strategies in 23 of these cases, but coercion failed half of the time: most often because the more powerful U.S. made demands that threatened the ; very survival of the weak state, causing it to resist as long as it had the means to do so. It is an unfortunate paradox Haun notes that, where the U.S. may prefer brute force to coercion, these power asymmetries may well lead it to first attempt coercive strategies that are expected to fail in order to justify the war it desires. He concludes that, when coercion is preferred to brute force there are clear limits as to what can be demanded. In such cases, he suggests, U.S. policymakers can improve the chances of success by matching appropriate threats to demands, by including other great powers in the coercive process, and by reducing a weak state leader's reputational costs by giving him or her face-saving options.