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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910460114303321 |
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Autore |
Dallaire Helene |
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Titolo |
The Syntax of Volitives in Biblical Hebrew and Amarna Canaanite Prose / Helene Dallaire |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Winona Lake, Ind. : , : Eisenbrauns, , 2014 |
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©2014 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (265 p.) |
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Collana |
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Linguistic studies in Ancient West Semitic ; ; 9 |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Wollen |
Verb |
Tontafel |
Hebräisch |
Hebrew language - Verb |
Hebrew language - Grammar, Comparative - Canaanite language |
Canaanite language - Verb |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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""Acknowledgments""; ""Abbreviations""; ""General""; ""Reference Works""; ""Introduction""; ""1.1.�Introduction""; ""1.2.�Assumptions""; ""1.3.�Methodology""; ""1.4.�Corpus of Texts""; ""1.5.�Definition of Terms""; ""1.6.�Sociolinguistic Issues""; ""1.7.�Modality in Sign Language""; ""1.8.�Three-Person System of Volitives""; ""1.9.�Modality in Semitic Languages""; ""Biblical Hebrew""; ""2.1.�Introduction""; ""2.2.�The Imperative""; ""2.3.�The Jussive""; ""2.4.�The Cohortative""; ""2.5.�Additional Verbs with Modal Functions""; ""2.6.�Conclusion"" |
""El Amarna Canaanite""""3.1.�Introduction""; ""3.2.�Proposed Paradigms for the Canaanite Verbal System""; ""3.3.�The Imperative""; ""3.4.�The Jussive""; ""3.5.�The yaqtula""; ""3.6.�Verbal Sequences with Volitives""; ""3.7.�Additional Verbs with Modal Functions""; ""3.8.�Conclusion""; ""Conclusion ""; ""4.1.�Yaqtul (Jussive)""; ""4.2.�Yaqtula""; ""4.3.�Yaqtulan(na)""; ""4.4.�Regular |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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"During the past century, numerous books and articles have appeared on the verbal system of Semitic languages. Thanks to the discovery of Ugaritic texts, Akkadian tablets, Canaanite letters found at Tell el-Amarna in Egypt, Hebrew and Aramaic inscriptions, and the Dead Sea Scrolls, our understanding of the phonology, morphology, and syntax of the Semitic languages has increased substantially. Dallaire focuses primarily on prose texts in Biblical Hebrew and Amarna Canaanite in which the verbal system (morphemes, syntax) expresses nuances of wishes, desires, requests, and commands. According to her, volitional concepts are found in every language and are expressed through verbal morphemes, syntagmas, intonation, syntax, and other linguistic means. The Syntax of Volitives in biblical Hebrew and Amarna Canaanite prose attempts to answer the following questions: do volitives function in a similar way in biblical Hebrew and Amarna Canaanite? Where and why is there overlap in morphology and syntax between these two languages? What morphological and syntactical differences exist between the volitional expressions of the languages? In attempting to answer these questions, the author bears in mind the fact that, within each of these two languages, scribes from different areas used specific dialectal and scribal traditions (for example, northern versus southern, peripheral versus central)." |
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2. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910786481803321 |
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Autore |
Annen Kurt |
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Titolo |
Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation / / Kurt Annen, Luc Moers |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2012 |
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ISBN |
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1-4755-2021-2 |
1-4755-3924-X |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (38 p.) |
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Collana |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Soggetti |
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Economic assistance |
Flow of funds |
Budgeting |
Exports and Imports |
Finance: General |
Social Services and Welfare |
Poverty and Homelessness |
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General |
Foreign Aid |
International Fiscal Issues |
International Public Goods |
National Budget |
Budget Systems |
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: General |
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) |
Government Policy |
Provision and Effects of Welfare Program |
International economics |
Budgeting & financial management |
Poverty & precarity |
Finance |
Social welfare & social services |
Foreign aid |
Budget planning and preparation |
Poverty |
Competition |
Poverty reduction |
Public financial management (PFM) |
Financial markets |
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International relief |
Budget |
China, People's Republic of |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size |
2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation. |
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