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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910459864803321 |
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Autore |
Forstrom Joanna K |
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Titolo |
John Locke and personal identity [[electronic resource] ] : immortality and bodily resurrection in 17th-century philosophy / / Joanna K. Forstrom |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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London ; ; New York, : Continuum, 2010 |
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ISBN |
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1-282-55199-X |
9786612551994 |
1-4411-1314-2 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (161 p.) |
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Collana |
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Continuum Studies in British Philosophy |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Identity (Psychology) |
Immortality |
Future life |
Resurrection |
Philosophy, Modern - 17th century |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Contents; Acknowledgements; Introduction; Chapter 1 John Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity: The Principium Individuationis, Personal Immortality, and Bodily Resurrection; Chapter 2 On Separation and Immortality: Descartes and the Nature of the Soul; Chapter 3 On Materialism and Immortality: Or Hobbes' Rejection of the Natural Argument for the Immortality of the Soul; Chapter 4 Henry More and John Locke on the Dangers of Materialism: Immateriality, Immortality, Immorality, and Identity; Chapter 5 Robert Boyle: On Seeds, Cannibalism, and the Resurrection of the Body |
Chapter 6 Locke's Theory of Personal Identity in Its Context: A Reassessment of Classic ObjectionsNotes; Bibliography; Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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One of the most influential debates in John Locke's work is the problem of personal identity over time. This problem is that of how a person at one time is the same person later in time, and so can be held responsible for past actions. The time of most concern for Locke is that |
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