Organizations at war in Afghanistan and beyond [[electronic resource] /] / Abdulkader H. Sinno

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910459772803321
• Autore: Sinno Abdulkader H. <1971->
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Ithaca, : Cornell University Press, 2008
• ISBN: 0-8014-5930-3
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (352 p.)
• Disciplina: 958.104
• Soggetti: Low-intensity conflicts (Military science) - Afghanistan; Organizational behavior - Afghanistan; Intergroup relations - Afghanistan; Electronic books.; Afghanistan History Soviet occupation, 1979-1989; Afghanistan History 1989-2001; Afghanistan History 2001-2021
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Maps and Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface -- Note on Transliteration -- 1. Organizing to Win -- Part One: An Organizational Theory of Group Conflict -- 2. Organization and the Outcome of Conflicts -- 3. Advantages and Limitations of Structures -- 4. The Gist of the Organizational Theory -- Part Two: Explaining the Outcomes of Afghan Conflicts -- 5. The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan -- 6. Resilience through Division, 1979-1989 -- 7. The Cost of the Failure to Restructure, 1989-1994 -- 8. The Rise of the Taliban, 1994-2001 -- 9. Afghan Conflicts under U.S. Occupation, 2001- -- Part Three: And Beyond . . . -- 10. The Organizational Theory beyond Afghanistan -- Glossary of Terms -- Participants in Post-1978 Afghan Conflicts -- References -- Index
• Sommario/riassunto: While popular accounts of warfare, particularly of nontraditional conflicts such as guerrilla wars and insurgencies, favor the roles of leaders or ideology, social-scientific analyses of these wars focus on aggregate categories such as ethnic groups, religious affiliations, socioeconomic classes, or civilizations. Challenging these ; constructions, Abdulkader H. Sinno closely examines the fortunes of the various factions in Afghanistan, including the mujahideen and the Taliban, that have been fighting each other and foreign armies since the 1979 Soviet invasion. Focusing on the organization of the combatants, Sinno offers a new understanding of the course and outcome of such conflicts. Employing a wide range of sources, including his own fieldwork in Afghanistan and statistical data on conflicts across the region, Sinno contends that in Afghanistan, the groups that have outperformed and outlasted their opponents have done so because of their successful organization. Each organization's ability to mobilize effectively, execute strategy, coordinate efforts, manage disunity, and process information depends on how well its structure matches its ability to keep its rivals at bay. Centralized organizations, Sinno finds, are generally more effective than noncentralized ones, but noncentralized ones are more resilient absent a safe haven. Sinno's organizational theory explains otherwise puzzling behavior found in group conflicts: the longevity of unpopular regimes, the demise of popular movements, and efforts of those who share a common cause to undermine their ideological or ethnic kin. The author argues that the organizational theory applies not only to Afghanistan-where he doubts the effectiveness of American state-building efforts-but also to other ethnic, revolutionary, independence, and secessionist conflicts in North Africa, the Middle East, and beyond.