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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910459282203321 |
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Autore |
Gourevitch Peter Alexis |
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Titolo |
Political power and corporate control [[electronic resource] ] : the new global politics of corporate governance / / Peter Alexis Gourevitch and James J. Shinn |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Princeton, : Princeton University Press, c2005 |
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ISBN |
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1-282-64175-1 |
9786612641756 |
1-4008-3701-4 |
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Edizione |
[Course Book] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (365 p.) |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Corporate governance |
Corporations - Investor relations |
Business and politics |
Corporations - Political activity |
International finance |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Includes statistical evidence from a sample of 39 countries, with detailed narratives of nine specific country cases. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. [313]-332) and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Introduction and summary argument -- Governance patterns: what causes what? -- Framing incentives: the economics and law tradition -- Politics: preferences and institutions -- Preference cleavages 1: class conflict -- Preference cleavages 2: sectoral conflict -- Preference cleavages 3: transparency, voice, and pensions -- Conclusion : going forward. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country |
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cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another. |
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