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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910458774403321 |
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Autore |
Cooper Rachel |
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Titolo |
Psychiatry and philosophy of science / / Rachel Cooper |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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London ; ; New York : , : Routledge, , 2014 |
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ISBN |
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1-317-49315-X |
1-317-49316-8 |
1-315-71184-2 |
1-282-94345-6 |
9786612943454 |
1-84465-398-6 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (208 p.) |
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Collana |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Psychiatry - Philosophy |
Science - Philosophy |
Psychiatry |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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First published 2008 by Acumen. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover; Half Title; Title; Dedication; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgements; 1 Introduction: psychiatry and philosophy of science; 1.1 An introduction to terms and concepts; 1.2 Is psychiatry a science? And who cares?; 1.3 An overview of the themes of the book; 2 The nature of mental illness 1: is mental illness a myth?; 2.1 Is mental illness in the eye of the psychiatrist?; 2.2 Is mental illness a historically unstable category?; 2.3 Is mental illness a moral, rather than medical, problem?; 2.4 Do the symptoms of mental illness depend too radically on social context? |
2.5 Can mental illness be viewed as a good thing?2.6 Conclusion; 3 The nature of mental illness 2: if mental disorders exist, what are they?; 3.1 The distinction between physical and mental disorders; 3.2 Biological accounts of disorder; 3.3 Fulford's action-based account; 3.4 Aristotelian accounts of disorder; 3.5 Messy accounts; 3.6 Disorder as a Roschian concept; 3.7 Conclusion; 4 Explanations in psychiatry 1: |
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natural-history based explanations; 4.1 More on natural kinds; 4.2 Arguments against mental disorders being natural kinds; 4.3 Are types of mental disorder natural kinds? |
4.4 Consequences4.5 Conclusion; 5 Explanations in psychiatry 2: individual case histories; 5.1 The simulation account of folk-psychological understanding; 5.2 Simulation and case histories; 5.3 What are the limits of simulation?; 5.4 Returning to tradition: this account of case histories compared with others; 5.5 Ethics and case histories; 5.6 Conclusion; 6 Relations between theories 1: when paradigms meet; 6.1 Kuhn on paradigms and normal science; 6.2 Kuhn on incommensurability; 6.3 Paradigms in psychiatry; 6.4 An extra problem Kuhn does not discuss: inter-professional rivalry |
6.5 Coordination without full communication6.6 Aiming for full communication across paradigms; 6.7 Conclusion; 7 Relations between theories 2: reductionisms; 7.1 Three types of reductionism; 7.2 What is the mind? Can theories about the mind be reduced to theories about the brain?; 7.3 Methodological reductionism; 7.4 Conclusion; 8 Managing values and interests 1: psychiatry as a value-laden science; 8.1 Introduction to the case studies; 8.2 Varieties of value-ladenness; 8.3 Comparison with other sciences; 8.4 What can be done?; 8.5 Conclusion |
9 Managing values and interests 2: big business and judging treatments9.1 An introduction to randomized controlled trials; 9.2 Problems with evaluating the effectiveness of treatments; 9.3 Social epistemology and the breakdown of trust in psychiatry; 9.4 Diagnosis of the problem; 9.5 Returning to psychiatry; 9.6 Conclusion; 10 Conclusion; Notes; Further reading; Bibliography; Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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""Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science"" explores conceptual issues in psychiatry from the perspective of analytic philosophy of science. Through an examination of those features of psychiatry that distinguish it from other sciences - for example, its contested subject matter, its particular modes of explanation, its multiple different theoretical frameworks, and its research links with big business - Rachel Cooper explores some of the many conceptual, metaphysical and epistemological issues that arise in psychiatry. She shows how these pose interesting challenges for the philosopher of scienc |
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