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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910458214903321 |
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Autore |
Baker Tom <1959-> |
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Titolo |
Ensuring corporate misconduct [[electronic resource] ] : how liability insurance undermines shareholder litigation / / Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Chicago ; ; London, : University of Chicago Press, 2010 |
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ISBN |
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1-283-05808-1 |
9786613058089 |
0-226-03507-7 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (295 p.) |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Executives' liability insurance - United States |
Executives' liability insurance - Law and legislation - United States |
Stockholders' derivative actions - United States |
Liability insurance - United States |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Introduction -- Shareholder litigation -- An introduction to directors' and officers' liability insurance -- The puzzle of entity-level D&O coverage -- Pricing and deterrence -- Insurance monitoring and loss-prevention programs -- The D&O insurer at defense and settlement -- What matters in settlement? -- Coverage defenses and disputes -- Policy recommendations: improving deterrence. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Shareholder litigation and class action suits play a key role in protecting investors and regulating big businesses. But Directors and Officers liability insurance shields corporations and their managers from the financial consequences of many illegal acts, as evidenced by the recent Enron scandal and many of last year's corporate financial meltdowns. Ensuring Corporate Misconduct demonstrates for the first time how corporations use insurance to avoid responsibility for corporate misconduct, dangerously undermining the impact of securities laws. As Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith demonstrate, this need not be the case. Opening up the formerly closed world of |
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