Delusion and self-deception : affective and motivational influences on belief formation / / edited by Tim Bayne and Jordi Fernandez

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910458200203321
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: New York : , : Psychology Press, , 2009
• ISBN: 1-136-87487-9; 1-283-04305-X; 9786613043054; 0-203-83804-1
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (312 p.)
• Collana: Macquarie monographs in cognitive science
• Altri autori (Persone): BayneTim; FernandezJordi
• Disciplina: 153
• Soggetti: Belief and doubt; Delusions; Self-deception; Electronic books.
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
• Nota di contenuto: Book Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgments; Editors; Contributors; 1 Delusion and Self-Deception Mapping the Terrain; 2 Passion, Reason, and Necessity A Quantity-of-Processing View of Motivated Reasoning; 3 Self-Deception and Delusions; 4 Delusion and Motivationally Biased Belief Self-Deception in the Two-Factor Framework; 5 Emotion, Cognition, and Belief Findings From Cognitive Neuroscience; 6 Perception, Emotions, and Delusions The Case of the Capgras Delusion; 7 From Phenomenology to Cognitive Architecture and Back; 8 Monothematic Delusions and Existential Feelings; 9 "Sleights of Mind" Delusions and Self-Deception10 Cognitive and Motivational Factors in Anosognosia; 11 Self-Deception Without Thought Experiments; 12 Hysterical Conversion A Mirror Image of Anosognosia?; 13 Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception; Author Index; Subject Index
• Sommario/riassunto: This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception. As pathologies of belief, delusions and self-; deception raise many of the same challenges for those seeking to understand them. Are delusions and self-deception entirely distinct phenomena, or might some forms of self-deception also qualify as delusional? To what extent might models of self-deception and delusion share common factors? In what ways do affect and motivation enter into normal belief-formation, and how might they be implicated in self-deception and delusion? The essays in this volume tackle