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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910457849803321 |
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Autore |
Hershberg James G (James Gordon), <1960-> |
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Titolo |
Marigold [[electronic resource] ] : the lost chance for peace in Vietnam / / James G. Hershberg |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C., : Woodrow Wilson Center Press |
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Stanford, Calif., : Stanford University Press, c2012 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (936 p.) |
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Collana |
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Cold War International History Project |
Cold War International History Project series |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975 - Peace |
Vietnam War, 1961-1975 - Diplomatic history |
Electronic books. |
United States Foreign relations 1963-1969 |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 867-873) and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Front matter -- The Cold War International History Project -- Contents -- Maps and Photographs -- Introduction -- A Note on Names and Terminology -- Abbreviations Used in the Text -- Prologue: Mission Impossible? “Operation Lumbago” and LBJ’s Thirty-Seven-Day Bombing Pause, December 1965–January 1966 -- Chapter 1: ÐÔng Chí Lewandowski’s Secret Mission: The Players Take Their Places, February–June 1966 -- Chapter 2: “Could It Really Be Peace?” Marigold’s “Devious Channels”—Act One: July 1966 -- Chapter 3: Intermezzo: August to October 1966—A “Mosaic of Indiscretions and Rumors” -- Chapter 4: “A Nerve-Eating Business”: Marigold Blossoms— Act Two: November 1966 -- Chapter 5: “Something Big Has Happened”: Toward the Warsaw Meeting, December 1–5, 1966 -- Chapter 6: Informing the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw: Nguyen Dinh Phuong’s Marigold Mystery Tour -- Chapter 7: “It Is Pity”: Waiting for Gronouski—December 6, 1966 -- Chapter 8: “It Looked as If We Could Move Forward”: Marigold in Suspense, December 7–13, 1966 -- Chapter 9: “The Americans Have Gone Mad”: Bombing Hanoi Again, December 13/14–18, 1966 -- Chapter 10: “The Christmas Present”: Marigold’s |
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Last Gasp, and First Leaks, December 19–24, 1966 -- Chapter 11: “The Ultimate Reply”: The End of the Affair, December 25–31, 1966 -- Chapter 12: Secret Spats: Talking and Fighting, January 1967 -- Chapter 13: “A Sunburst of Recriminations”: Riders on the Storm, February–June 1967 -- Chapter 14: The Long Year Wanes: D’Orlandi, Lodge, and Lewandowski Leave Vietnam, March–June 1967 -- Chapter 15: “You Will Never Get the Inside Story”: The Secret Search for The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam, May 1967–March 1968 -- Chapter 16: Sequels, Revivals, Regrets: Marigold’s Echoes during LBJ’s Last Year, February 1968–January 1969 -- Epilogue: “A Lot More Dead Young Soldiers”—Last Words, and the Battle for History -- Acknowledgments -- A Note on Sources -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography -- About the Author -- Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Marigold presents the first rigorously documented, in-depth story of one of the Vietnam War's last great mysteries: the secret peace initiative, codenamed "Marigold," that sought to end the war in 1966. The initiative failed, the war dragged on for another seven years, and this episode sank into history as an unresolved controversy. Antiwar critics claimed President Johnson had bungled (or, worse, deliberately sabotaged) a breakthrough by bombing Hanoi on the eve of a planned secret U.S.-North Vietnamese encounter in Poland. Yet, LBJ and top aides angrily insisted that Poland never had authority to arrange direct talks and Hanoi was not ready to negotiate. This book uses new evidence from long hidden communist sources to show that, in fact, Poland was authorized by Hanoi to open direct contacts and that Hanoi had committed to entering talks with Washington. It reveals LBJ's personal role in bombing Hanoi as he utterly disregarded the pleas of both the Polish and his own senior advisors. The historical implications of missing this opportunity are immense: Marigold might have ended the war years earlier, saving thousands of lives, and dramatically changed U.S. political history. |
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