1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910457605403321

Autore

Milgrom Paul R (Paul Robert), <1948->

Titolo

Putting auction theory to work / / Paul Milgrom [[electronic resource]]

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2004

ISBN

1-107-71323-4

1-283-32916-6

9786613329165

0-511-16543-9

0-511-81382-1

0-511-16612-5

0-511-16417-3

0-511-55570-9

0-511-16497-1

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (xxii, 368 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)

Collana

Churchill lectures in economics

Disciplina

381/.17/01

Soggetti

Auctions - Mathematical models

Auction theory

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. 339-346) and indexes.

Nota di contenuto

Getting to work -- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms -- The envelope theorem and payoff equivalence -- Bidding equilibrium and revenue differences -- Interdependence of types and values -- Auctions in context -- Uniform price auctions -- Package auctions and combinatorial bidding.

Sommario/riassunto

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction



design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.