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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910456812203321 |
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Autore |
Goldstick D (Daniel), <1940-> |
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Titolo |
Reason, truth, and reality / / Dan Goldstick |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Toronto, [Ontario] ; ; Buffalo, [New York] ; ; London, [England] : , : University of Toronto Press, , 2009 |
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©2009 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (348 p.) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Reason |
Rationalism |
Ethics |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Part One: Introductory -- 1. Introduction -- 2. On Moore's Paradox -- 3. On Factuality -- 4. On the Canons of Deductive Inference -- 5. Preliminary Assault on the Philosophy of Empiricism -- Part Two: On the Canons of Induction -- 6. Preliminary Considerations -- 7. Sensationalism -- 8. Naturalism -- 9. Inductivism -- 10. Pragmatism -- 11. Nihilism, Scepticism, and Decisionism -- 12. Possibility, Probability, Negation, and Change -- 13. Causality and Impermanence -- 14. Simplicity -- 15. How to Reason Inductively -- 16. The Case for Universal Impermanence -- 17. That Determinism Is Incontrovertible -- 18. The Pitfall of Metaphysics -- Part Three: On the Canons of Morality -- 19. Preliminary Considerations -- 20. Sensationalism -- 21. Naturalism -- 22. Inductivism -- 23. Pragmatism -- 24. Nihilism, Scepticism, and Decisionism -- 25. Ethics and Induction -- 26. Mores -- 27. 'Consciencelessness' -- 28. Utility -- 29. Comparing Utilities -- 30. Population -- 31. 'Hypocrisy' Stipulatively Defined -- 32. Utilitarianism Proved -- 33. Conclusion: We Each Sit in Judgment -- Appendix 1: 'Tautology' -- Appendix 2: 'Desire' -- Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Dan Goldstick's Reason, Truth, and Reality addresses two questions: |
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what sort of world do we inhabit? and what moral obligations do we have? To answer the questions Goldstick mounts a bold contemporary defense of pre-Kantian rationalism. Basing consideration upon a characterization of reason in its deductive, inductive, and ethical functioning, he asks what must hold good for reason so characterized to be a dependable guide to truth. The conclusions Goldstick draws are threefold. First of all, the argument points to continuous deterministic causality throughout space and time. In the second place, a case is made for universal impermanence. And thirdly, Goldstick claims to establish a basis for the right within a version of utilitarianism supporting the maximum long-term promotion of people's interests. The discussion takes in such traditional rationalist themes as aprioricity, conceivability, and antiscepticism, and such analytic topics as belief-and-desire, truthvaluelessness, and epistemic reliability. |
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