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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910456074803321 |
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Titolo |
Politics, policy and organizations [[electronic resource] ] : frontiers in the scientific study of bureaucracy / / edited by George A. Krause & Kenneth J. Meier |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Ann Arbor, : The University of Michigan Press, c2003 |
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ISBN |
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1-282-44516-2 |
9786612445163 |
0-472-02404-3 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (361 p.) |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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KrauseGeorge A. <1965-> |
MeierKenneth J. <1950-> |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Bureaucracy |
Public administration |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Contents; Preface; The Scientific Study of Bureaucracy: An Overview; Part 1. Theory; Why Do Bureaucrats Delay? Lessons from a Stochastic Optimal Stopping Model of Agency Timing, with Applications to the FDA; Agency Risk Propensities Involving the Demand for Bureaucratic Discretion; Veto Points, Policy Preferences, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in Democratic Systems; The Benefits of Agency Policy-making: Perspectives from Positive Theory; Part 2. Methodological Technology; Donut Shops, Speed Traps, and Paperwork: Supervision and the Allocation of Time to Bureaucratic Tasks |
Adapting Agencies: Competition, Imitation, and Punishment in the Design of Bureaucratic PerformancePart 3. Empirical Studies; Consensual Rule Making and the Time It Takes to Develop Rules; Why It Matters Whether State Bureaucrats as Opposed to Federal Bureaucrats Administer Federal Programs; Structural Choice and Political Control of Bureaucracy: Updating Federal Credit Programs; Administrative Structure and Social Democratic Results: The Case of Education; Bureaucratic Discretion and Regulatory Success without Enforcement; |
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